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This dissertation addresses and resolves problem of selection among multiple
equilibria in games, by perturbing the original system and then characterizing the
outcome of resulting perturbed system.
Chapter 2 examines reputational sequential equilibrium of what we call par-
ticipation games, that have many economic applicability, such as entry deterrence
and product quality control. By perturbing the original game with types, we show
that the lower bound of the single long run player’s payoﬀ is almost his Stack-
elberg commitment payoﬀ in the limit as the ﬁnite horizon grows. Discontinuity
exists between the inﬁnite horizon and the limiting ﬁnite horizon solution. Our
result is robust to a model modiﬁcation in which the long run player announces
the payoﬀ structure just before the whole game begins so that the rational type
of long run player has to mimic not only the strategy but also the initial payoﬀ
announcement of the Stackelberg commitment type.
Chapter 3 and chapter 4 analyze a game played by randomly and anonymously
matched players from a large population. The game of interest is a multiperson
ixcoordination game with multiple strict Nash equilibria. In chapter 3, players are
fully rational, but adjustment is costly. Equilibrium outcomes are fully character-
ized as a function of group size and level of friction. We examine limiting results
and their links to static equilibrium concepts. The equivalence between risk dom-
inance and learning outcomes previously shown in two-player games fails with
three or more players. Surprisingly, the limit as the friction disappears coincides
with the selection from global perturbation and strict iterated admissibility. For
a pure coordination game, a much stronger result can be shown to support equi-
librium Pareto eﬃciency—as long as the friction is suﬃciently small—regardless
of group size either. Finally, we also provide numerical results that have some im-
plications for several well-known experiments on coordination failure and history
dependence.
Chapter 4 clariﬁes the relationship between adjustment or evolutionary dy-
namics studied in the literature. Two types of dynamic process turn out to pos-
sess the power of resolving indeterminacy: the deterministic adjustment dynamics
with patient players, and the stochastic evolutionary dynamics with myopic play-
ers. Roughly speaking, the dynamically attractive outcome obtained with patient
players corresponds to the static equilibrium assuming correlated play of oppo-
nents, while the long run state obtained with noisy myopic players corresponds to
the static equilibrium selection predicted by independent play of one’s opponents.
We show that, if and only if group size equals two (ie, 2×2 games), the dynamic
outcome from either type of process happens to coincide risk dominance. For any
pure coordination game, a much stronger result obtains supporting the Pareto
eﬃciency, regardless of the underlying dynamics.
xChapter 1
Overview
1Chapter 2 examines reputation sequential equilibria of what we call partici-
pation games, that have many economic examples, such as entry deterrence and
product quality control. By perturbing the original game with types. we show
that the lower bound of the single long run player’s payoﬀ is almost his Stack-
elberg commitment payoﬀ in the limit as the ﬁnite horizon grows. Discontinuity
exists between the inﬁnite horizon and the limiting ﬁnite horizon problem. Double
traps may exist in some important subclass of games, namely enttry- inducement
games. Our result is robust to a model modiﬁcation in which the long run player
announces the payoﬀ structure just before the whole game begins so that the ratio-
nal type of long run player has to mimic not only the strategy but also the initial
payoﬀ announcement of the Stackelberg commitment type. This chapter has a
direct implications for some laboratory experimental results, such as Camerer and
Weigelt (1988).
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focuse on games played by randomly and anony-
mously matched players from a large population. The class of games I study are
symmetric, multiperson coordination games with multiple strict Nash equilibria.
Existing reﬁnements are powerless to choose between these equilibria. One way to
resolve this indeterminacy is to consider an actual adjustment or learning process
which operates in real time. If this process settles down to a unique outcome, then
this outcome should be the analyst’s prediction of how the game might be played.
Therefore, this approach has the potential to explain how equilibrium is attained,
and of singling out a unique equilibrium in situations where the underlying stage
game has a plethora of outcomes.
Chapter 3, “Adjustment Dynamics with Patient Players,” studies fully rational
deterministic adjustment dynamics, in which players can revise their choices only
periodically. Dynamic equilibrium outcomes are fully characterized as a function
2of the payoﬀ matrix and the eﬀective discount rate. More importantly, the dy-
namic outcome in the limit as players become very patient selects uniquely from
the strict Nash equilibria depending on the payoﬀ matrix. The resulting equilib-
rium selection suggests the following introspection arguments. Consider a player
about to play a one shot n-player coordination game, in which there are two strict
Nash equilibria where either all players choose action H, or else all players choose
action L. No player knows which equilibrium will actually be played in advance.
Each player faces (n−1) opponents, and so there are n possibilities where in each
possibility k out of (n−1) opponents choose action H for k = 0,...,n−1. Assume
that the player places uniform probability 1/n on each of these possibilities, and
on the basis of this assumption, the player is asked to choose his action. Notice
that this probability assignment necessarily implies some degree of correlation
between opponents’ choices.
Surprisingly, the outcome just described coincides with static notion of equilib-
rium selection called global perturbation. Trembles are introduced into the game
in such a way that payoﬀs are almost but not perfectly common knowledge among
players, and that there is a chance that each of the actions can be a dominated
strategy. More precisely, each player receives a noisy, private signal about the
payoﬀs, but the player is unable to fully disentangle the true payoﬀ realization
from his private signal. Lack of common knowledge among the players makes it
possible for strictly dominated strategies to exert an inﬂuence. This fact suggests
that to solve the resulting incomplete information game we must use iterative
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The result of iterative strict dom-
inance prescribes that all players play either one of the two actions, depending
on the payoﬀ matrix of the unperturbed game. Equilibrium selection based upon
global perturbation refers to the one obtained at the exactly original game as
3common knowledge about payoﬀs becomes arbitrarily perfect.
On the other hand, in the opposite limit as players become myopic, both strict
equilibria can be reached, and exactly which equilibrium will occur in the long run
depends crucially upon the historical accident of the initial state. This is reﬂected
in the fact that, in the framework of an evolutionary process which assumes my-
opia, Darwinian deterministic dynamics may well possess multiple steady states,
and that the asymptotic behavior of the system depends on initial conditions.
Trouble persists even if we perturb the deterministic dynamic system with a one-
time mutation, which is the idea behind the concept of standard evolutionary
stability. Moreover, notice that the connection between myopic replicator dynam-
ics and strategic stability or rationalizability is vacuous in coordination games,
since all strict Nash equilibria simply survive strict iterative admissibility.
Chapter 4, “Evolutionary Learning with Experimentations,” resolves the equi-
librium selection indeterminacy by introducing a probabilistic ﬂow of small mu-
tations or experimentations, thus making the dynamic system stochastic. The
resulting stochastic law of motion possesses a well-deﬁned, steady-state ergodic
distribution. Consequently, this approach highlights certain strategy conﬁgura-
tions as likely to be observed much more frequently than others, especially in
the limit as the chance of mutations vanishes. It turns out that the power of
distinguishing between multiple strict Nash equilibria returns even under myopia.
The long-run state derived using stochastic evolutionary dynamics with myopic
players corresponds to the static equilibrium selection motivated by the follow-
ing introspection arguments. Consider again a player whose opponents choose
either actions H or L, except that they choose with probability half on either ac-
tion. Assume further that opponents’ choices are done independently. Under this
assumption, the player can calculate the expected payoﬀ from each action, and
4the player should choose his own action on the basis of this calculation. Notice
that this independence assumption contrasts sharply with the presumed correla-
tion obtained with patient players. Also notice that, in two person games, this
distinction simply disappears because each player has only one opponent.
Much of the existing literature has asserted that the limit dynamic equilibrium
outcome coincides with Harsanyi and Selten’s notion of risk dominance. In my
two papers, I provide a overview of the connection between the nature of the ad-
justment dynamic process and static equilibrium selection. Generally, I refute the
conjectured equivalence between the limit dynamic outcome and risk dominance.
I also show that in two-person, bimatrix coordination games all the following
equilibrium selection rules coincide with each other: (1) dynamic outcomes with
patient players, (2) stochastic evolutionary dynamic outcomes, (3) static selection
based on global perturbation, and (4) risk dominance. And ﬁnally, in general, for
any pure coordination game, a much stronger result can be obtained supporting
Pareto eﬃciency, irrespective of the underlying dynamics.
To recapitulate, the contribution of my research is threefold. First, my research
provides a full characterization of the limiting dynamic equilibrium outcomes in
multiperson games. Second, it clariﬁes the relationship between the nature of
the dynamic system and static equilibrium selection. Roughly speaking, the limit
dynamic outcome obtained with patient players corresponds to static equilibrium
selection assuming correlated play by one’s opponents, whereas the steady state
with noisy myopic players corresponds to selection predicted by independent play
by one’s opponents. Third, it refutes the conjectured equivalence between limit
dynamic outcomes and risk dominance. More speciﬁcally, this equivalence turns





Consider a situation in which a single long run player faces a ﬁnite sequence
of short run opponents, each of whom plays only once, but who observes all
previous outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to see whether the long run
palyer can acquire or maintain a reputation in participation games. In each stage
participation game, a short run player decides ﬁrst whether to choose an outside
option or to enter a certain martket. With a short run player’s staying out of
the market, the stage game immediately ends. With her decision to participate
into the relevant market, a chance is given for the long run player to move. The
reader should notice that a distinguished feature of participation games lies in its
sequential move structure. Depending on the stage game payoﬀs, participation
games are divided into two interesting classes, entry-deterrence game and entry-
inducement game.
A representative example of entry-deterrence games is Selten [1977] chain-store
paradox. As a justiﬁcation for seemingly irrational entry deterring behavior by
means of irreversible investments and limit pricing, Kreps and Wilson [1982b] and
Milgrom and Roberts [1982] study repatational equilibria in a framework of chain-
store game. They showed that, if there is a small uncertainty about the payoﬀs
of the long-lived incumbent(a l` a Kreps and Wilson), or if every player knows the
payoﬀs of the incumbent but this is not common knowledge(a l` a Milgrom and
Roberts), then reputation eﬀects for predation would come into play. Such a
reputation drives short run potential entrants out of the relevant market possibly
except near the end of the game.
There are many practical applications which can be modelled as entry-inducement
games, such as a quality game between consumers and a monopolistic producer
(Fudenberg and Levine [1989a]), an asset market game between investors or work-
7ers and a capitalist (Fudenberg and Levine [1989b]), a sovereign debt game be-
tween foreign banks and a less developed country(Bulow and Rogoﬀ [1989a,b]),
etc. Consider a quality game, which is depicted in Figure 1. Call the ”Stackelberg
outcome” as the long run player’s most preferred pure strategy proﬁle of the stage
game under the constraint that the short run player chooses a best reponse based
on her beliefs and the strategies of her opponent. Then the Stackelberg outcome
would be the monopolist’s promising high quality and the consumer’s purchasing,
while the only perfect eqiulibrium is the consumer’s not buying. On the contrary
to the entry-deterrence game, the recognition that the long-lived producer has
no method of demonstrationg that he is of high quality type so that building a
reputation would be impossible has been pervasive. Indeed in the inﬁnite horizon
problem, it is not hard to contruct a pertrubation and an equilibrium of the re-
sulting perturbed game such that the lower bound of long run player’s payoﬀ is
less than Stackelberg outcome. This is no more the case in the limit of the ﬁnite
horizon problem. The long run player even in the entry-inducement game can
maintain a reputation so as to gain at least his Stackelberg payoﬀ, although the
reputational equilibrium is more fragile near the end game than thereof a deter-
rence game. With respect to this point, I show that double-sided traps exist in
some ﬁnal periods in an inducement game, whereas only one-sided traps do in a
deterrence game. These observations are consistent with the experimental results
as of Camerer and Weigelt [1988].
It may be interesting to enumerate other possible recipes to market failures
which naturally occur in inducement games. First, precommitment or enforceable
preplay contract will simply guarantee the long run player at least the Stackel-
berg payoﬀ. Second, as Fudenberg and Levine [1989a] proposed, we may solve
the transformed game with simultaneous move structure by requiring short run
8players to choose her best reponse from observationally equivalent set of actions.
Their idea is based on the known fact that the long run player always can aquire
a reputation for some commitment type in any simultaneous move game. Third,
the long-lived guy may send some credible signals, such as advertising (Klein and
Leﬄer [1981]) and private disclosure or warranty in a quality game (Grossman
[1981]) and collateral in a debt game. The present paper does without any of
the assumptions discussed above. Instead, I analyze whether a sequential repu-
tational equilibrium can be constructed only by introducing small perturbations
into original participation games.
This paper complements previous literature on reputational eﬀects in simul-
taneous move games with long and short run players, which is mainly attributed
to works by Fudenberg and Levine. Fudenberg and Levine [1989a] showed that
if only pure strategies are allowed on the part of the single long run player, then
he can obtain the Stackelberg commitment payoﬀ except at most a ﬁxed ﬁnite
number of periods. Fudenberg and Levine [1992a] considered a situation in which
mixed strategies are also allowed. According to their simple calculating method,
the lower bound on the long run player’s discounted normalized payoﬀ would be
very close to his Stackelberg commitment payoﬀ. I derive similar results in par-
ticipation games, which is a simple deterministic stage games but has a lot of
practical applicability. While Fudenberg and Levine focused on Nash equilibria in
inﬁnite horizon problems, I characterize sequential equilbrium in a ﬁnite horizon
problem and take its limit.
The paper consists of three parts. Section 2.2 analyzes the sequential equi-
libria in the simplest version of participation games, that is enough to contain
all economic implications. Section 2.3 deals with the situation where the long
run player determines the payoﬀ structure before the whole game begins. This
9modiﬁcation not only makes closer to the real world practice but also strengthens
our result. Last section concludes.
2.2 The Model
There is a ﬁnite sequence of dates indexed backwards by t = T ,..., 2, 1. At
each date t, there are two players, L and St. The single long run player L lives
forever and a short run player St lives only one period during the date t. At the
beginning of each date t, the entire past history of outcomes up to date t+1 is
public information. We assume no discounting so that player L’s time-averaging
proﬁt will be 1
T
PT
t=1 Πt. A participation game is deﬁned as in the opening section.
Without any loss of economic intuition, consider the simplest case in which, given
player St’s decision to participate into the relevant market, player L must make a
binary decision of whether to say yes or no. The general form of the stage game
payoﬀs is depicted in Figure 2. We may assume that by > b0 always holds.
I study only two versions of game of great importance: with by > 0 > b0 in
common, either 0 > ay > a0, or a0 > ay > 0. All other cases are of little interest,
since the unique perfect equilibrium will be trivial, no matter what one sided
incomplete information in my sense there might be. I name the game with the ﬁrst
type of payoﬀ structure as an entry-deterrence game (D-game for short) and the
second as an entry-inducement game (I-game for short). A stage D-game has two
Nash equilibria [Out] and [In, Yes], but only the latter one is subgame perfect.1 On
the other hand, a one stage I-game has the unique Nash and perfect equilibrium
[Out]. Notice that, under the assumption of complete information, there is no
reason why the equilibrium of the T period repeated game becomes anything
other than the mere repetitions of the perfect equilibrium of the stage game.
1The other Nash equilibrium is subgame imperfect, since it can be supported only by an
incredible oﬀ-the-equilibrium threat, i.e. player L’s no.
10Thus, a D-game refers to the situations where, even though the noncooperative
equilibrium that naturally arises would be short run players’ participations, the
long run player wants them to stay out of the market. An I-game refers to the
opposite situation. If we deﬁne a Stackelberg payoﬀ as what the single patient
player prefers most as far as short run opponents choose best response to their
own beliefs and the long run player’s strategies, it would be the value a in any
participation game. The question is whether the single patient player can build
the reputation in the I-game as nicely as in the D-game. The answer is positive.
If and only if we let the original game perturbed by introducing a little incomplete
infomation, we can construct a sequential reputational equilibrium in both D- and
I-game. Moreover, this has a uniqueness property.
Throughout this paper, one sided incomplete information and perfect recall
will be assumed. Also assumed is that any player in the game may implement
neither precommitment technology nor signalling device. A single long run player
and T short run players will play one of two possible games,2 each of which
involves T repetitions of a particuar stage game. This one-sided informational
incompleteness stems from short run players’ uncertainty about exactly which
type of the long run player they are against. The long run player knows exactly
which of these actually obtains. The ﬁrst possible game is the original game, while
the second one is the game in which the long run player behaves as if he committed
himself to a particular action. The long run player in the original unperturbed
game is called a ”rational” type. He is called a ”strong” and an ”honest” type in
the D-game and the I-game, repectively. Every short run player has an identical
initial belief that the long run player is likely to be rational with probability 1−ρ
and to be strong or honest with its complementary probability ρ, where 0 < ρ < 1.
2Milgrom and Roberts [1982] analyzes a richer model with three types in the framework of
D-game. We will consider two type case only at the expense of analytical complications.
11A useful solution concept to analyze these games with incomplete information is
the sequential equilibrium as developed in Kreps and Wilson [1982a].
Without loss of generality, we may normalize the payoﬀs as follows: let ay =
0,a0 = −1,by = b,b0 = b−1, and L’s payoﬀ with S’s Out equals a in the D-game
and let ay = a,a0 = 1 + a,by = 1 − b,b0 = −b in the I-game, where a > 0 3 and
0 > b > 1.
Attention ought to be made on the I-game, thus all proofs and explanations
will be made with repect to the I-game. For the purpose of comparisons, however,
we also put down the results for the D-game in parenthesis. Let pT = ρ ∈ (0,1),
and for t = T − 1,...,1,
pt = Pr{L is of a honest(strong) type | H
T
t+1},
with the recursive deﬁnitions as follows:
i) St+1’s Out conveys no information, thus pt = pt+1.
ii) St+1’s In and L’s Yes(No) together with pt+1 > 0 result in pt = max{bt,pt+1}.
iii) Otherwise, pt = 0.
Whereas the honest(strong) L is always to say Yes(No), the strategy of the rational
L would be as follows:
For t=1, say No(Yes) surely.
For t ¿ 1,
i) if pt ≥ bt−1 then say Yes(No) surely.
ii) if pt < bt−1 then say Yes(No) with probability qt =
(1−bt−1)pt
(1−pt)bt−1
3However, we assume a > 1 in D-game. The case of 0 < a < 1 would result in a qualitatively
similar characterization as a > 1 possibly except in the endgame. For details, refer to Kreps
and Wilson [1982b] p.265.
12Strategy of St is to choose In(Out) with probability:
1 if pt > bt.
1
1+a (1
a) if pt = bt.
0 otherwise.
Proposition 1 The strategies and belifs given above is a unique sequential equi-
librium for the T-repeated I-game(D-game).
Proof: The rough idea of the proof is as follows. Provided that the ﬁrst period
short run player St entered the relevant market and that the remaining periods
were suﬃciently long, even the rational L should behave as if he was of the honest
type. The reason is that, if player L is somehow given an opportunity to move,
to say no brings about an immediate gain of 1+a but zero in all subsequent dates
since all the subsequent short run players interpreting L’s previous saying no as
a deﬁnite evidence that L is not an honest guy will simply stay out, whereas
to say yes yields only a at the date T but a stream of positive expected proﬁts
later. Given L’s stategy described above, St would participate into the market. In
actuality, this is optimal for every St, T ≤ t ≤ T ∗, and for the rational L during
T ≤ t ≤ T ∗ + 1, where T ∗ = inf{t | bt < ρ}. Each player St from the date T ∗ − 1
on randomizes optimally, as long as all previous short run players actually came
in and player L always responded with yes. It is in player L’s interest to start
randomization between yes and no from the date T ∗ on.
To instruct the reader, I provide a complete calculation of the equilibrium for
the T = 2 case only. Moreover, I will not mention the behavior of the honest
type, since he has no alternative but to always say yes whenever player S enters.
For T = 1, it is trivial to show that S1 would choose coming in, staying out, or
13randomizing iﬀ p1 > b,p1 < b, or p1 = b, respectively, and that the rational L
responds with no, the stage game best response, with probability one. Now for
T = 2, let us suppose that player L’s strategy at t=2 is to say yes with probability
q2 and say no with probability 1−q2. The optimality principle of Bellman implies
that player L must be indiﬀerent between the strategy prescribed above and that
of surely saying no. That is, (1 − q2)(1 + a) + q2(a + ∆(1 + a)) = 1 + a, which,
together with the consistency of beliefs on the sequential equilibrium path, gives
rise to:
∆ ≡ Pr(S1 comes In | S
0
2s In was responded with Yes,




Let us look at the short run players’ beliefs and behaviors. Given player S1’s
observation of L’s having said yes at t=2, his posterior probability that L is honest
will be revised using Bayes’ rule, so that we have
p1 = Pr(L is honest|In and Yes observed at t=2)
=
p2
p2 + q2(1 − p2)
(2.2)
If and only if this posterior probability is greater than (resp. equal, less than) b,
then S1 should enter with prob 1 (resp. prob ∆ = 1
1+a, prob 0).
By the consistency of beliefs required on the equilibrium path, q2 is computed





Player S2 will enter, randomize with probability ∆ = 1
1+a, or stay out, according
as [p2+q2(1−p2)](1−b)+(1−q2)(1−p2)(−b) is greater than, equal to, or smaller
than zero, repectively, i.e. p2 >,=, or < b2 using the eq (1). It can be easily
checked that there are three possible situations depending upon the size of ρ and
14b. In the ﬁrst situation where ρ < b2 < b, any type of player L gets nothing with
probability one, since both S1 and S2 would stay out so even the honest long run
player has no opportunity to demonstrate the truth. In the second situation in
which b2 < b < ρ, both S1 and S2 would surely enter and player L at t=2 would
surely say yes but the rational L at t=1 surely says no on the equilibrium. In the
last case of b2 < ρ < b, player S2 would come in with probability one, player L at
t=2 randomizes, player S1 randomizes as long as he L acually obseved payer L’s
saying yes at the previous date t=2.
For general T > 2, the reader can easily verify4 not only Bayesian consistency
of St’s beliefs and L’s strategies but also optimality of every player’s moves starting
from any information set of the game. Then the optimality principle of Bellman
ensures that no player can beneﬁt by unilaterally changing its strategy starting
from any point.
The proposition above seems to show that the properties as well as the paths
look identical on the sequential reputational equilibria for T-repeated games of
both D- and I-game. However, their qualitative nature and economic implication
are very much diﬀerent mainly in that the reputational equilibrium is far more
fragile in the I-game than in the D-game. For a clearer comparison, we should
investigate their evolutionary structures. Let us look at the D-game at the date
T ∗−1 where pT∗−1 > 0, which implies that all the previous S’s participations have
been met by player L’s response of no. Now if ST∗−1’s randomization leads him
to staying out of the market, then his immediate successor ST∗−2 would certainly
enter (since pT∗−2 = pT∗−1 = bT∗−1 < bT∗−2) and player L at the date T ∗−2 would
randomize. If player L happens to say no at the date T ∗ − 2, his reputation for
4Refer to details in Kreps and Wilson [1982b] p.259-260, or Milgrom and Roberts [1982]
p.306-311.
15toughness could be restored so that again pT∗−2 = bT∗−2 attains. The game will
evolve in the same manner for any t = T ∗−1,....,3,2. In other words, the long run
player can demonstrate that a short run player’s decision of entering was mistaken
even near the end of the D-game in a weak sense that he actually does this only in
the course of optimal randomizations. On the contrary, there is a ”double-sided
trap” in each date after T ∗ in the I-game. The ﬁrst trap refers to the situation
where player L loses his reputation for honesty in the event of saying no, which
stems from player L’s randomization processes. The D-game also has this feature
in common. More importantly and specially only in I-game, the following second
trap comes from S’s randomizations. Supposed that pT∗−1 > 0 and that ST∗−1’s
randomization leads her to staying out, then every subsequent short run player will
simply stay out. This may happen with non-negligible probability although the
long run player has been always replied with yeses. Moreover, once this happened,
even the honest guy has no way of demonstrating his honesty. In summary, the
I-game reputational equilibrium is far more fragile, in the sense that a player S’s
observing not only no by player L but also out by one of her predeccessors makes
her simply choose staying out of the relevant market.
Immediate from the results thus far is the following:
Corollary 1 Fix any participation game. In the limit as the horizon goes to
inﬁnity, the lower bound that the long run player obtains is almost his Stackelberg
payoﬀ.
In the inﬁnite horizon participation game, it is easy to construct a situation in
which the long run player cannot obtain his Stackelberg payoﬀ.5 Hence, there is
a discrepancy between the limit of the least equilibrium payoﬀ to the long run
player as its ﬁnite horizon goes to inﬁnity and that when the horizon is inﬁnite.
5One can ﬁnd an example in Fudenberg and Levine [1989a].
162.3 Announcement and Commitment
A practical aspect that many examples of the I-game have in common may be
that, given a short run player’s participation into the relevant market, there is a
tradeoﬀ between the long run player’s short term proﬁt and the relevant short run
player’s payoﬀ. Moreover, their payoﬀs are usually control variables the long run
player can determine. In a quality game, given a consumer’s decision to purchase
one unit of goods the monoplist wants to sell, a negative relationship between the
level of product quality and the monopolist’s short term proﬁt seems to obviously
exist. In an asset market game as in Fudenberg and Levine [1989b], after some
investors or workers provide their assets or labors to the single patient capitalist,
a similar conﬂict may exist between returns to investors wage compensations to
the workers and proﬁts to the capitalist.
To investigate this situation, we slightly modify the payoﬀ structure. As before,
player St’s choosing an outside option yields nothing to both player L and himself.
Player St’s participation directly brings about −1 to himself and y to player L.
Here −1 that player St gets can be interpreted as disutility from consuming low
quality goods in a quality game and as value of ﬁnancial assets provided to the
capitalist in an asset market game. The long run player decides whether to oﬀer
a compensation 1+w to the short run player or not at all. We assume that player
L determines a level of w and that all the short run players somehow get to know
the precise value of w before the whole game begins.6 Presumably, a condition
that 1 + w > 0 must hold, since otherwise In is a dominated strategy for player
St,∀t, thus every St will simply stay out. On the other hand, player L has no
incentive to oﬀer the gross compensation greater than y, so that y > 1 + w also
6This is not an innocuous assumption. Refer to Hart and Tirole [1988] for some results
without this restriction.
17holds. Some reader might guess that player L has no incentive to oﬀer more than
1 + ,∀ > 0. This is wrong because a reduction of the compensation by player L
brings about not only beneﬁts from directly raising his own share but also costs
from losing some customers who would have surely come in before.
As a prelimenary for the main result of this section, the reader can check the
following lemma by mimicking proofs of proposition 1:
Lemma 1 For w ﬁxed, the beliefs and strategies described below is the unique
plausible sequential equilibrium for a perturbed T-repeated game.
Beliefs of St.
i) St+1’s staying out reveals no information, thus pt = pt+1,
ii) St+1’s In and L’s Yes together with pt+1 > 0 result in
pt = max{(1 + w)−t,pt+1},
iii) Otherwise, pt = 0.
Strategy of the rational L.
For t = 1, say No surely
For t > 1,
i) if pt ≥ (1 + w)t−1, then say Yes surely,




In surely if pt > (1 + w)−t,
In with prob 1+w
y if pt = (1 + w)−t,
Out surely otherwise.
18Let us deﬁne T ∗ = inf{t | (1 + w)−t < ρ}. On the sequential equilibrium
path, every short run player St for t = T,T −1,...,T ∗ participate into the market
with probability one, and player L optimally replies with sure yeses to those
entries up to t = T ∗ + 1 and then randomizes thereafter. Now suppose that
player L can determine w before the whole game begins. Let w∗ be the level
of net compensation that maximizes player L’s time-averaging payoﬀ in a T-
repeated game. We should notice that player L may lose some sure customers by
raising his own share (y − (1 + w∗)), thus there is a tradeoﬀ between w∗ and T ∗.
Notwithstanding, it is optimal for player L to reduce the value of w∗ as much as
he can keep the number of short run players who surely enter the same as before.
Therefore, the proﬁt maximization of the rational long run player requires the
local condition, which states formally: For any type of player L and for given T ∗,
proﬁt maximizing w∗ must satisfy (1 + w∗)−T∗
= ρ.
First, we calculate the best randomizing strategy on the part of the rational
L. Since his time-averaging payoﬀ is VR ≡ 1
T[(T −T ∗)(y −(1+w∗))+y] by using
the optimality principle of Bellman, the rational player L’s objective will be to
maximize VR subject to
(LOC) (1 + w∗)−T∗
= ρ,
(ICC) y > 1 + w∗ > 1,
given y > 1,ρ > 0, and T. Deﬁne a pair (w∗
R,T ∗
R) to be the rational L’s maxi-
mization solution.
Now we characterize the optimal announcement on the part of the honest type
of the long run player. Recall that the sequential equilibrium of I-game suﬀers from
double traps in the endgame. ¿From player St’s strategy described in Lemma 1
and the local condition for proﬁt maximization, the honest type’s expected payoﬀ




[y − (1 + w
∗)][T − T
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∂T∗2 < 0 at T ∗ =
T ∗
R, unless y is too small. Henceforth, if we denote the honest type’s optimal
randomizing strategy as (w∗
H,T ∗
H), it is true that w∗
H < w∗
R and T ∗
H > T ∗
R. This
implies that,in order to conceal his type, the rational L has to propose the same
payoﬀ announcement as the honest type, so that he oﬀers a smaller compensation
to short run players and has to sacriﬁce some of the sure customers.
The point is that the rational L must mimic the behavior of the honest coun-
terpart in terms of not only actions but also payoﬀ announcement. Even with this
additional constraint, we get the following:
Proposition 2 In the limit as T goes to inﬁnity, we have
i) T ∗ → ∞, but T∗
T → 0; ii) w∗ → 0. Moreover, ∂T∗
∂y < 0, ∂T∗
∂ρ > 0; ∂w∗
∂y > 0, ∂w∗
∂ρ < 0.
Proof: I deal with T ∗ as continuous variable, since doing so loses nothing but
calculating complications. Applying the Lagrangian method to the maximization




































together with limT→∞ T ∗ = ∞. We proved i).
On the other hand, taking log to both sides of (LOC) and rearranging yields
w∗ = ρ
−1
T∗ − 1, thus limT→∞ w∗ = limT∗→∞ w∗ = 0. The second part ii) is also
done.
The proposition above implies that, as the horizon gets larger and larger, the
number of short run players who optimally randomize near the end of the game
also should be controlled larger, while its relative proportion gets negligible. In
other words, the proportion of sure customers who enter the market with proba-
bility one monotonically approaches to unity. In addition, the long run player can
optimally reduce the amount of net compensation that provides to some short run
players incentives to participate into the relevant market. The second part shows
some comparative statics which states that the optimal net compensation become
smaller as the horizon gets larger, as shortrun player’s probability assessment that
player L is of the honest type gets bigger, and as the total revenue to player L gets
smaller. As a consequence, the long run player is able to obtain almost extensive
form Stackelberg payoﬀ for suﬃciently long horizon T. Moreover, in the limit as
the horizon T approaches to inﬁnity, the -ﬁrst-best is indeed attainable.
2.4 Final Remarks
Consider repeated games in which a single patient player plays against a ﬁnite se-
quence of short run opponents. As a particular deterministic stage game in which
short run players move ﬁrst in each stage game, a participation game may have
many practical applications, such as entry-deterrence behavior by an incumbent,
a quality choice by a monopolist, a debt decision by a less developed country, etc.
21I study charaterizations and properties of the sequential equilibrium in ﬁnitely-
repeated participation games only by introducing a small perturbations into the
original game. I show that reputation eﬀects play an important role in any par-
ticipation game as almost nicely as in any simultaneous move game. This is a
surprising counterargument to the common view that the single patient player
is not able to acquire or maintain a reputation in ﬁnitely repeated I-games. As
a limit of ﬁnitly repeated participation games, the reputational equilibrium of
the inﬁnitely repeated game is also well characterized. Therefore, the fact that
the long run player can obtain his Stackelberg payoﬀ was shown, although the
Stackelberg payoﬀ here is diﬀerently calculated from that of simultaneous move
games. These consequences are robust to a model modiﬁcation where the long
run player announces the payoﬀ structure, which puts an additional contraint on
the behavior of rational type.
An important problem that is worth being pursued will be to calculate the
lower bound that the long run player can obtain on any sequential equilibrium of
general extensive form game in the limit as the horizon grows.7
7Schmidt [1990, 1992] analyzes repeated bargaining problem and games with conﬂicting
interest.
22Figure 2.1: Product Quality Game
Figure 2.2: Entry Deterrence Game





In this paper, we analyze a game played by randomly and anonymously matched
players from a large population. Players face a perfect foresight deterministic
dynamic process with costly adjustment. The class of games we study are sym-
metric binary action mutiperson coordination games with two strict Pareto-ranked
Nash equilibria.1 Consideration of these games is motivated by the simple game-
theoretic issue of selection in games with multiple equilibria in which existing
reﬁnements are powerless. For instance, many of the stringent solution concepts
proposed in the literature, such as the strategic stability of Kohlberg and Mertens
[1986], are silent concerning the selection among several strict Nash equilibria.
Furthermore, some recent studies on learning and evolution have also addressed
the question of how a particular equilibrium will emerge in a dynamic context.2
Although some convergence results are obtained, these studies do not oﬀer an
equilibrium selection criterion, since in these models all strict Nash equilibria
share the same dynamic properties.
One approach for resolving this indeterminacy is to consider an actual adjust-
ment process which operates in real time, and to see what limit outcomes if any
might appear. For example, we allow players to have the opportunity from time
to time to revise their choices given what their opponents are currently doing,
and given the “correct” expectation about the future play of the game (namely,
perfect foresight). If this continuous revision process settles down to a unique
outcome, then this outcome should be the analyst’s prediction of how the game
1This class of games represents, in a stylized fashion, the types of interactions prevalent in
network externalities such as compatibility of computer software, video tapes, typewriter key-
boards, and language, as well as many recent Keynesian macroeconomic models of coordination
failures, geographical formation of core and periphery (Krugman [1991]).
2A partial list of this literature includes Jordan [1991], Fudenberg and Kreps [1992a], Canning
[1992], Milgrom and Roberts [1990, 1991], and Fudenberg and Levine [1992a, b].
26might be played. Therefore, this approach has the potential of explaining how
an equilibrium is attained, and of singling out a unique equilibrium in situations
where the underlying static game has multiple Nash equilibria.
This avenue has been explored in recent adaptive or evolutionary formulations,
3 most of which have asserted that the limit dynamic equilibrium outcome coincide
with Harsanyi and Selten’s [1988] static notion of risk dominance. The limit
behavior of Blume’s [1] dynamic process with respect to parametric changes that
make strategy revisions a best response is shown to give rise to the same outcome
as risk dominance selection in coordination games. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
[1992] consider evolutionary models for a ﬁnite population in discrete time with
constant ﬂow of mutations, which generate Markov processes in the behavioral
pattern. Fudenberg and Harris [1992] study a version of the replicator dynamic
in continuous time for a large population. In this paper, the random perturbation
of the system is introduced by a Brownian motion. These last two papers show
the same result: for 2 × 2 games, as the mutation rate and noise go to zero,
the distribution becomes concentrated on the risk dominant equilibrium. Lastly,
Matsui and Matsuyama [1991]—from which the present paper borrows heavily—
shows an equivalence between risk dominance and dynamic stability in a two
person bimatrix game of common interests.
The results of this paper cast strong doubt on the conjectured equivalence be-
tween the limit dynamic outcome and risk dominance. We will show that, for the
Matsui and Matsuyama approach, these two notions “happen” to coincide only in
3This is nothing but one strand of numerous frameworks. Other popular and interesting ap-
proaches, which speciﬁcally study games with multiple equilibria, are ﬁctitious learning (Krishna
[1992]), learning with bounded memory or ﬁnite automata (Aumann and Sorin [1989]; Binmore
and Samuelson [1992]), Turing machine learning under computability (Anderlini and Sabourian
[1991] and references therein), and so on. Another game of great importance is prisoner’s
dilemma, which Young and Foster [1991] analyzes using stochastic evolutionary dynamics, and
Nowak and May [1992], Glance and Huberman [1992], and references therein provide computer
simulation results in machine learning framework.
27the two person bimatrix game. First, we will fully characterize the dynamic equi-
librium outcome in terms of group size and a friction parameter which depends
positively on the discount rate of players and negatively on the chance of their ac-
tion switches. To say the friction disappears implies that players are very patient,
or that each player can revise his choice whenever he wants. On the other hand,
to say the friction grows without bound implies that players are myopic, or that
they choose strategies once and for all. A state is said to be globally attractive
if there exists an equilibrium path that reaches or converges to that state from
any initial condition. It is shown that, in the limit as the friction vanishes, either
everyone’s playing one action or everyone’s playing the other will be the globally
attractive state, depending upon the payoﬀ matrix.
Surprisingly, the limit as the friction approaches zero turns out to coincide with
Carlsson and Van Damme’s [1990, 1991] notion of equilibrium selection through
perturbation of the original game. The original game is perturbed in such a way
that each player receives a private signal about the payoﬀs, but is unable to fully
disentangle the true payoﬀ realization from one’s private noise. Lack of com-
mon knowledge among players makes it possible for strictly dominated strategies
to exert an inﬂuence. This fact suggests that, to solve the resulting incomplete
information game, we must use iterative elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies. When common knowledge about payoﬀs becomes arbitrarily perfect among
players, the result of iterative strict dominance prescribes that all players play
either one or the other action, depending on the payoﬀ matrix of the original
unperturbed game. The major argument of this paper is that this globally at-
tractive dynamic outcome, in the limit as the friction disappears, coincides with
equilibrium selection based on a global perturbation approach.
As veriﬁed by Matsui [1992], the opposite limit as players become myopic is
28closely related to a version of evolutionary stability, attributed to Swinkels [1992a].
Note that the evolutionarily stable strategy is deﬁned as a strategy distribution
which is robust against a once-and-for-all invasion by a small number of mutants.
For this limit dynamic, the payoﬀ matrix does not matter at all and only the ini-
tial fraction of each action type does. Such indetermincy is resolved if we perturb
the dynamical system with a constant ﬂow of mutations and experimentations.
The idea behind mutations is to test the stability of states by repeatedly sub-
jecting them to disturbances, and observing to which states the society tends to
return. My companion paper [19] not only characterizes the long run ergodic
distribution in the limit as the probability of mutations vanishes, which suggests
a criterion for selecting among multiple strict Nash equilibria; it also clariﬁes the
link between the features of the underlying dynamics and the static equilibrium
selection. Roughly speaking, the long run state obtained with patient players cor-
responds to the static equilibrium assuming correlated play of opponents, while
the long run state obtained with myopic players corresponds to the static equilib-
rium selection predicted by independent play of one’s opponents.
The present paper may also have substantial implications with regard to re-
cently developed experimental results by Van Huyck et al. [1990, 1991] on coor-
dination failure, and by Cooper et al. [1990] on the predictability of Nash equi-
librium. In particular, we provide theoretical and numerical evidence that is
consistent with the following observations:
• weak dominance,
• a wide dispersion of initial eﬀort choices,
• a trend to drift in small group treatments,
• a rapid convergence to the Pareto-worst Nash equilibrium regardless of ini-
tial strategic uncertainty when the group size is large and the summary
29statistic aﬀecting each player’s payoﬀ is the minimum eﬀort choice among
the group (i.e. large group minimum treatment),
• a strong history dependency in large group median treatments,
• and Pareto eﬃciency in pure coordination problems.
To recapitulate, coordination failure and history dependency are the most remark-
able features, respectively, under minimum and median rule, when the group size
is large.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 oﬀers an intu-
itive exposition of the basic idea with a simple example. Section 3.3 formally
deﬁnes the game of interest. Section 3.4 sets up the dynamic model and then
characterizes its dynamic equilibrium outcomes. Section 3.5 contains calculations
two important static equilibrium selection concepts, namely global perturbation
and risk dominance. This same section proves the equivalence between the limit
adjustment dynamic outcome and the static equilibrium selection based on global
perturbation. Section 3.6 proves a strong result that, in any –symmetric or asym-
metric – 2 × 2 game, the limit dynamic equilibrium outcome coincides with the
selection based on global perturbation. This is also true even if the speed of ad-
justments are diﬀerent, as long as the proportion between them is ﬁxed in the
limit. Section 3.7 studies two interesting subclasses of the original game, that
is, pure coordination and stag hunt games. Section 3.8 oﬀers numerical evidence
within the framework of the stag hunt game used in experimental studies. The
last section concludes with some suggestions for future research.
3.2 An Exposition
Consider the following highly stylized game. A forest is inhabited by a stag and a
number of hares. There are n identical hunters that simultaneously and without
30communication have to choose between hunting a stag or a hare. If a player
decides to hunt for a hare, his payoﬀ is $x no matter what the other hunters
may choose. If the player decides to pursue a stag then his payoﬀ is determined
not only by his own choice but by the actions of others, summarized by a simple
statistic. Roughly speaking, stag hunting is successful only when enough of the
hunters cooperate. Under a “minimum rule,” even a single defection from full
cooperation results in a failure. Under a “median rule,” the cooperation of 50%
of the hunters is suﬃcient for a successful stag hunt. We further specify that a
successful stag hunt yields $10 to each of the participants, whereas a failure brings
about nothing. The normal form of this game is called the stag hunt game, the
two and three-player version of which are depicted in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.
We ﬁrst study the dynamic evolution of the social equilibrium played by a large
population. Each hunter is randomly and repeatedly matched with (n − 1) other
players to play the stage stag hunt game anonymously. Players are fully rational,
maximizing their discounted average expected payoﬀ, with the dynamic path on
which they condition their expected payoﬀs perfectly foreseen. However, there is
friction: not every player is able to switch his own action every period. While this
assumption is stylized, it can be interpreted as a transaction cost. For example, it
could be the cost of switching from rabbit traps to hunting riﬂes. All the hunters
are assumed to observe what fraction of hunters in the society as a whole are
choosing between hares and stags. Given the opportunity to switch, each hunter
chooses an action that maximizes his expected utility conditional on the correct
expectation of the future play of the game. The dynamic equilibrium outcome
is fully characterized as a function of group size n, and the eﬀective discount
rate ρ. The eﬀective discount rate takes into account both the real-time discount
rate and the cost to switching actions. The long run steady state of the social
31equilibrium must end up with either everyone hunting stag or everyone hunting
hares, depending upon the payoﬀ x and the initial fraction of stag hunters. While
not regretting their individual choice in either equilibria, people in hare hunting
society are nevertheless worse oﬀ than those in stag hunting society. Defection
by a single individual or a negligible number of agents is simply in vain. In other
words, all hunters may be playing a best response, but there is a chance that these
best responses implement a Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
To take a concrete example, let n = 2 and ρ = 1
2. It can be shown that the
“good” stag (“bad” hare) equilibrium can result regardless of the initial popu-
lation fraction of hare hunters, if the sure return to rabbit hunting x, is smaller
than $4 (greater than $6).4 In the case where x is between $4 and $6, the his-
torical accident with regard to the initial fraction of hunter types plays a crucial
role in determining exactly the long run equilibrium. Now, as players become
more patient in the sense that ρ approaches to zero, the middle region of history
dependency shrinks. There is a single limiting threshold value of x equal to the
average payoﬀ of the stag hunt under the assumption that the possibility of each
opponent’s hunting stag is equally likely. According to this assumption, since the
probability that the opponent chooses stag and the probability that his opponent
chooses hare are equal, the threshold is 1
2 × 10 + 1
2 × 0 = $5. To compare with
another set of parameters, let n = 3 and ρ = 1
2, under a minimum rule. Then
the history dependent region would be between $2.28 and $4.28, which shrinks to
an inﬁnitesimal area around 1
3 × 10 + 2
3 × 0 = $3.33, if people care very much
about their future. Roughly put, in the limit as people are extremely patient,
the society eventually settles down on the stag (hare) equilibrium if x is smaller
(greater) than $3.33. For a last example with n = 7 under a median rule, it is
4The reader will have to trust me for the accuracy of these numbers, which are calculated
using Eqs. (3.5)–(3.8) derived in Section 3.4.
32easy to check the limit critical value equals 4
7 × 10 + 3
7 × 0 = $5.71.
We now turn to Harsanyi and Selten’s [1988] notion of risk dominance. The
deﬁnition of risk dominance is based on a hypothetical process of expectation
formation starting from an initial situation where it is common knowledge that
either the stag equilibrium or the hare equilibrium must be the solution without
knowing which one is the solution. Consider a process in which players ﬁrst, on
the basis of a preliminary theory, form priors on the strategies of their opponents.
The preliminary theory can be summarized as follows: (i) Each player i believes
that either all the other players hunt stag with a subjective probability zi or all
other players hunt hares with its complementary probability; (ii) each player i
plays his best response to this belief; (iii) the zi are independently and uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. Unfortunately this naive theory will not work since this best
reply strategy combination will generally not be an equilibrium point of the game,
and therefore it cannot be the outcome chosen by a rational outcome selection
theory. The second-order best reply to the ﬁrst-order vector is iteratively calcu-
lated. Thereafter, players gradually adapt their prior expectations to the ﬁnal
equilibrium expectations by means of a tracing procedure. As the tracing proce-
dure progresses, both the prior vector and the best response strategy combination
are subjected to systematic and continuous transformations until both of them
ﬁnally converge to a speciﬁc equilibrium of the game. Thus at the end of the trac-
ing procedure both the players’ actual strategy plans and expectations about each
other’s strategy plans will correspond to the same equilibrium point, representing
the risk dominant outcome.
Fortunately, the tracing procedure can be accomplished in one round in the
present stag hunt game. Consider the n = 2 case. According to steps (i) and (ii)
33of the preliminary theory, hunter i chooses stag if:
zi × 10 + (1 − zi) × 0 > x or zi >
x
10
where i = 1, 2. Using step (iii), player i knows that his opponent chooses stag with
probability (1 − x
10) and hare with the complementary probability x
10, therefore
the prior must be revised to the posterior (1 − x





) × 10 +
x
10
× 0 > x or x < $5.
We conclude that the stag hunt risk dominates hare catching if x < $5 and
vice-versa. For another example, let n = 3 under a minimum rule. Following
the steps described above suggests that the critical x value be the solution to
10 × (1 − x
10)2 + 0 × [1 − (1 − x
10)2] = x, so that risk dominance selects stag if
x < $3.82.
Finally we examine Carlsson and Van Damme’s [1990, 1991] notion of global
perturbation. It is based on the idea that players are uncertain about the payoﬀs
of the game. Trembling the game is made in such a way that payoﬀs are almost
but not perfectly common knowledge, and that there is a chance that each of the
actions can be a dominated strategy. To be speciﬁc, assume that the true number
of hares is uncertain. One extreme possibility is that no rabbit might be available
so that hare hunting only incurs an eﬀort cost, while the other extreme possibility
is that the forest might be indeed crowded with rabbits so that even a successful
stag hunt fares worse than the hare hunt. More formally, there is a small but non-
negligible probability that x < 0 in which rabbit hunting is strictly dominated,
and x > $10 in which stag hunting is strictly dominated. Each hunter receives
a private signal that provides an unbised estimate of the true common value x,
but the signals are noisy so the true value of x will not be common knowledge.
34The player then chooses whether to hunt stag or hare. Assume that the noise
can be at most $0.50. For instance, if the true value of x is $5.50, then all the
private signals must be somewhere between $5 and $6 from an outsider’s point of
view. Imagine a situation in which a particular hunter i just observes his private
signal xi equal to $5.50. Even if he knows, upon having observed $5.50, that the
true x lies between $5 and $6 and that all the other xj’s are between $4.50 and
$6.50, this is in fact not common knowledge to hunters i and j. Now suppose that
hunter j observes xj = $4.50. Hunter j knows that the true x lies between $4
and $5, and xi lies between $3.50 and $5.50. The problem is that hunter i does
not know that hunter j knows that his xi lies in the interval [$3.50, $5.50]. Lack
of common knowledge expands all the way down, and therefore enables remote
areas of dominated strategies where x is negative or greater than $10 to exert an
inﬂuence. This argument may well apply to all the other less extreme realizations
of xj in the interval [$4.50, $6.50], say $5.70 instead of $4.50, and any smaller
size of the maximum noise, say a dime or a penny instead of 50 cents. Later
we will show that equilibrium can be characterized using iterative elimination of
strictly dominated strategies, and that it possesses a cutoﬀ property. Finally, we
are interested in what happens with the payoﬀ realization that corresponds to the
original game.
Take the n = 2 game. As was suggested, we maintain the assumption that no
player will choose strictly dominated strategies. Hunter i will certainly choose stag
if the secure return from catching hare is negative, i.e. x < 0. Since the expected
true value of x conditional on his private signal xi is simply xi because of unbi-
asedness, player i knows that stag is strictly dominant at each such observation.
Consider xi to be slightly above zero. Notice that, with the additional assumption
that the private signal is uniformly distributed around the true common value of
35x is imposed, the probability that your xj is bigger than my xi does not depend
upon xi, thus the conditional probability must always be half. Player i knows
that his opponent j will hunt stag if xj < 0, hence i’s payoﬀ if he hunts stag at xi
would be approximately 1
2 × 10 + 1
2 × 0 = $5. As an astute reader might see,
the process of eliminating strictly dominated strategies ends up in one iteration
for stag hunt games. In other words, the same logic applies not only to an xi
slightly above zero, but also to any xi below $5. Since the expected payoﬀ from
hare hunting is xi, we conclude that each hunter should hunt a stag (hare) if his
private signal about the secure return form hunting hares is smaller (larger) than
$5. For example with n = 3 under a minimum rule, it can be similarly calculated
that a hunter should choose a hare only when his private signal is smaller than
1
3 × 10 + 2
3 × 0 = $3.33.
Table 3.1 provides the cutoﬀ values calculated for the limit adjustment dy-
namic outcome, risk dominance, and global perturbation in the case of minimum
and median rules when the number of players are n = 2, 3, 15, 99.5 The reader
may be aware that the dynamic equilibrium outcome selection in the limit as the
eﬀective discount rate ρ goes to zero coincides with the static equilibrium selection
based on global perturbation but not of risk dominace. This is not by chance! We
will verify this equivalence in general coordination games.
3.3 The Game
We consider a symmetric n-person coordination game with binary actions, denoted
High (H) and Low (L). The normal form game denoted by G(n,Π) has 2n number
5It is interesting to note that under the minimum rule, global perturbation is more conserva-
tive than risk dominance, in the sense that there is a subset of x such that risk dominance selects
the risky Pareto-superior choice while global perturbation prescribes the secure Pareto-inferior
action. This observation implies that coordination failures are more severe from the viewpoint
of global perturbation than of risk dominance.
36of cells, but due to symmetry only 2n cells need to be taken into account. Consider
a strategy proﬁle in which k agents choose H with the remaining (n − k) agents
choosing L; we denote πH
k and πL
n−k to be the payoﬀ for a player taking H and






























The ﬁrst set of inequalities in Eq. (3.1) imply that a player taking a particular
action is no worse oﬀ when the number of opponents taking the same action
increases. The next two inequalities require that everyone playing a common
action is a strict Nash equilibrium. The last inequality means that the equilibrium
where everyone plays H, denoted H, is better than where everyone plays L, denoted
L. Figure 3.2 depicts an example of a three-person coordination game with H is
stag and L is hare. Now the following preliminary result is straightforward:
Lemma 2 If Π ∈ Ω then the only pure strategy equilibria of G(n,Π) are two strict
Nash, viz. H and L.





n−k+1, since otherwise the pure strategy proﬁle of k players











which contradicts the deﬁnition of the Ω set.
Any of the Nash reﬁnements, including the strategic stability of Kohlberg and
Mertens, is powerless in selecting between these two strict Nash equilibria. Pareto
eﬃciency is compatible with equilibrium play, so neither an incentive problem nor
37conﬂict exists. However, it is not clear whether players will be able to reach this
outcome in a noncooperative situation where no direct communication is allowed.
In short, strategic uncertainty matters.
3.4 Adjustment Dynamics
3.4.1 The Model
Time is continuous from t = 0 to ∞. The game G(n,Π) is played repeatedly in a
society with a continuum of identical players.6 At every point in time, each player
is matched to form a group with the other (n − 1) players, who are randomly
drawn from the population playing the game anonymously. All players behave ra-
tionally, choosing a strategy to maximize expected discounted payoﬀs. Because of
anonymity, they engage in this maximization without taking into account strategic
considerations such as reputation, punishment, and forward induction.
The key assumption is that not every player can switch actions at will. Every
player needs to make a commitment to a particular action in the short run. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that the opportunity to switch actions arrives randomly,
following a Poisson process with parameter λ, the mean arrival rate. It is further
assumed that this process is independent across the players and that there is no
aggregate uncertainty. The strategy distribution in the society as of time t can be
thus described as yt, the fraction of the players that are committed to action H as of
t. Due to the restriction mentioned above, the social behavior pattern yt changes
continuously over time with its rate of change belonging to [−λyt,λ(1 − yt)].
Furthermore, any feasible path necessarily satisﬁes y0e−λt ≤ yt ≤ 1−(1−y0)e−λt,
where the initial condition y0 is given exogenously or “by history.”
6Boylan [1992] veriﬁes that, if the population is countably inﬁnite, there exists a probability
space and a sequence of random variables which correspond to a random matching process such
that the law of large numbers can nicely apply, i.e. there is no aggregate uncertainty. Green
[1989] oﬀers some big enough probability space to encompass the continuum model.
38When the opportunity to switch arrives, players choose the action which results
in the higher expected discounted payoﬀs, recognizing the future path of y as well
as their own inability to switch actions continuously. The value of playing action



































t (1 − yt)
n−kφk, (3.2)
where φk ≡ πH
k − πL
n−k+1 is nondecreasing in k. Given the opportunity, players
commit to take H if Vt > 0 and to L if Vt < 0 and are indiﬀerent if Vt = 0, where





with r > 0 being the discount rate. We deﬁne ρ ≡ r
λ to be the eﬀective discount
rate or the degree of friction. Therefore, {yt}∞
t=0 is an equilibrium path from y0 if





λ(1 − yt) if Vt ≥ 0,
−λyt if Vt ≤ 0, (3.4)
for any t. This states that all players currently playing action H (respectively L),
if given the chance, switch to L (resp. H), when Vt < (resp. >)0.
3.4.2 Characterization
We borrow from Matsui and Matsuyama [1991] the following terminology. A
state y is called accessible from y0, if an equilibrium path from y0 that reaches or
converges to y exists. It is called globally attractive if it is accessible from any
y0 ∈ [0,1]. A state y is called absorbing7 if a neighborhood U of y exists such that
any equilibrium path from U converges to y. It is fragile if it is not absorbing. The
7Although this is the same concept as asymptotically stable according to standard terminology
in dynamical systems, we simply use absorbing due to the presence of multiple paths. It should
be emphasized that this is nothing to do with the Markov processes.
39deﬁnition does not rule out the possibility that a state may be both fragile and
globally attractive, or that a state may be uniquely absorbing but not globally
attractive. However, we will show that these situations will not occur in this
model.
We will show that the parameter Π characterizes the game to be in one of
three sets Ω0,Ω1 and Ω01, where the state y = 0 is globally attractive in Ω0, the
state 1 is globally attractive in Ω1, and both states are absorbing in Ω01. For this









) and βk(n,ρ) ≡ αn−k+1(n,ρ). (3.5)
For notational simplicity, we suppress (n,ρ) whenever possible. We denote the
vectors α = (α1,α2,...,αn) and β = (β1,β2,...,βn). The reader might be embar-
rassed with the complicated forms of the coeﬃcients αk’s and βk’s. According
to the lemma below, however, they play a role as weights, putting higher (resp.
lower) weight on larger k in α (resp. β). The weight is spread equally over all the
k’s as the friction disappears, while it concentrates on an extreme k as the friction
grows without bound.




k=1 βk = 1, ∀ρ;







ρ→∞α = (0,...,0,1) and lim
ρ→∞β = (1,0,...,0).
Proof is deferred to the Appendix. The “ · ” denotes the inner product




k, etc. We derive proposition 3
together with the deﬁnition of the sets:
Ω0 = {Π ∈ Ω|α · Π
H ≤ β · Π
L}, (3.6)
40Ω1 = {Π ∈ Ω|β · Π





Proposition 3 The state y is globally attractive iﬀ Π ∈ Ωy for either y = 0 or
y = 1; both y = 1 and y = 0 are absorbing iﬀ Π ∈ Ω01. Moreover, if an absorbing
state, y, is globally attractive, then it is a unique absorbing state in [0,1] and any
other state must be fragile.
Proof Provided in Appendix.
Proposition 4 (a) In the limit as ρ → 0, the state y = 1 (resp. y = 0) is













(b) in the limit as ρ → ∞, both states are absorbing and no state globally attractive.
Proof Part (a) is clear from Lemmas 3(b) and (c). As ρ goes to inﬁnity, Lemma
3(d) together with Eq. (3.1) implies that both Ω0 and Ω1 become empty, while
Ω01 eventually occupies the whole set Ω.
Keep in mind that the smaller (larger) size of ρ implies the more (less) patience
and/or a shorter (longer) duration of an action commitment.8 The smaller the
degree of friction ρ gets, the more the long run equilibrium tends to rely on
the payoﬀ matrix speciﬁcation and the less on the initial position of strategic
uncertainty, and vice versa. As players are more patient and/or it costs less to
switch their choices, the steady state will be the good Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium
8Indeed, r → 0 implies that players are more concerned about the future. That λ → ∞
might have two opposite eﬀects: players are less concerned about the future whilst the current
strategy distribution becomes less important. Nevertheless, a strictly positive r guarantees that
the second eﬀect always dominates the ﬁrst one. Therefore, the smaller ρ gets, the more players
worry about the future.
41as long as the “static” unweighted average from H exceeds that from taking L.
The interpretation is as follows: Suppose you are going to play a one shot game
G(n,Π). Since you are confronted with (n − 1) opponents, there are n possible
events, denoted Ak−1, k = 1,2,...,n, where exactly (k−1) opponents choose action
H. You assume that each of those events takes place with equal probability 1
n, and
makes your best response. Notice that this necessarily implies some correlation
among your opponents’ choices.
On the other extreme case of ρ approaching to inﬁnity, sometimes called best
response dynamics, both states may obtain in the long run and exactly which
one would come out depends solely upon what the initial state was. In fact,
Matsui [1992] veriﬁes an equivalence between the best response dynamics and a
static equilibrium concept attributed to Swinkels [1992a]. This notion, called an
evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants, imposes an additional restriction
on the qualiﬁcation of mutants, thus is weaker than the traditional evolutionary
stability. Notice that the connection9 of “myopic” replicator dynamics to strate-
gic stability or rationalizability would be vacuous in coordination games, because
both Nash equilibria simply survive the strict iterated admissibility. Such inde-
terminacy is resolved if we perturb the dynamical system with a constant ﬂow
of mutations and experimentations. Kim [1992b] not only characterizes the long
run ergodic equilibrium of the resulting stochastic dynamics in the limit as the
probability of mutations approaches to zero, but also provides clear and intuitive
comparions between the equilibrium selections derived. The reader is urged to
refer to that paper for details.
9Refer to Swinkels [1992b] and references therein.
423.5 Equivalence with Global Perturbation
The global perturbation approach of Carlsson and Van Damme [1990, 1991] is
based on the idea that players are uncertain not only about the payoﬀs but also
their modeling of the game itself. Each player i will receive a private signal θi that
provides an unbiased estimate of θ, but the signals are noisy so the true value of
θ is not common knowledge. Let Θ be a random variable and let {Ei}n
i=1 be an n
tuple of i.i.d. random variables, each having zero mean. The Ei are independent
of Θ, with a continuous density and a support within [−1,1]. For ε > 0, write
Θ
ε
i = Θ + εEi.
Notice that ε measures perfectness of the common knowledge.
Given this structure, we formally deﬁne the incomplete information game
Gε(n,Π) described by the following rules: A realization (θ,θ1,...,θn) of (Θ,Θε
1,...,Θε
n)
is drawn, player i is informed only about θi and chooses between H and L, each
player i receives payoﬀs as determined by G(n,Π(θ)) and the action taken. Even
if player i knows upon having observed θi that the true θ lies in [θi − ε,θi + ε]
and that all other θj’s in [θi − 2ε,θi + 2ε], this fact is not common knowledge.
Now suppose that θj is realized as, say, θi −2ε, then player j knows that θ lies in
[θj −ε,θj +ε], thus in [θi−3ε,θi+ε], and that θi must be in [θj −2ε,θj +2ε], thus
in [θi − 4ε,θi]. The problem is that player i does not know that player j knows
that θi lies in [θi −4ε,θi]. This argument applies also to all the other less extreme
realizations of θj. Lack of common knowledge expands all the way down, and
thus enables remote areas of dominated strategies (−∞,θ) and (¯ θ,∞) to exert an
inﬂuence, however tiny ε might be as far as it is strictly positive.10
We conﬁne our attention to the perturbation pH
k (resp. pL
n−k) that satisﬁes the
10Such remote areas play an important role in Rubinstein [1989] as well.
43following two conditions:
Assumption 1 (a) They are continuous, monotonically increasing (resp. de-
creasing) in θ, and unbounded above and below, ∀k; (b) the original unperturbed
game obtains with θ = 0, i.e. pζ
· (0) = πζ
· for ζ =H,L.
Let ¯ θ (resp. θ) the inﬁmum (resp. supremum) of θ’s such that H (resp. L) is a
strictly dominant strategy in a game with payoﬀ realization θ. By assumption 1
above, it is obvious that −∞ < θ < 0 < ¯ θ < +∞.
Assumption 2 The Θ is uniformly distributed over an interval ⊃ [θ, ¯ θ].
One might ask whether this is a big perturbation. Answer is both no and yes. As it
turns out, our goal is to see what happens at the exactly original games in the limit
as the common knowledge about payoﬀs is almost perfect, after characterizing
the equilibrium behavior assuming this perturbation. Neverthless, players are
taking very diﬀerent situations from the original game into account through his
contemplation process. Uniformity part would play an important role, since only
order but not location of the realizations of random noise variable matters. We
believe that our main points would still emerge without this restriction, but we
have not veriﬁed that this is the case. A guess on the relaxation of this assumption
will be made in the last section.
Under these assumptions, an iterative elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies, namely strict iterated admissibility, will be applied. The next lemma shows
that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium has the cutoﬀ property, and that the game
considered here is indeed dominance solvable.
Lemma 4 If Assumption 1 and 2 hold, then the equilibrium is characterized by
cutoﬀ θGP such that player i optimally chooses H (resp. L) iﬀ θi > (resp. <)θGP.









44Proof Provided in Appendix.
Recall that the perturbed game will correspond to the original unperturbed
game when θ = 0. We are interested in what happens at θ = 0 in the limit as
the common knowledge about payoﬀs becomes arbitrarily perfect, i.e. ε goes to
zero. Recall that |θi| < ε if θ = 0. So if θGP > (resp. <)0 for ε small enough then
θi < (resp. >)θGP for all i when θ = 0. In other words, if θGP < (resp. >)0, then
when θ = 0 and ε is suﬃciently small, the results of iterative strict dominance
prescribe that all players play H (resp. L). So we say that the equilibrium H in
the unperturbed game is robust with respect to global perturbation if θGP < 0, and
that L is robust if θGP > 0. Recall that the state y be the fraction of population
taking action H. Then argument thus far yields:
Main Theorem The y = 1 (resp. 0) is the unique absorbing and globally
attractive state in the limit as ρ → 0 if and only if action H (resp. L) is robust
with respect to global perturbation.
A couple of papers in the literature deserve some mention. Harsanyi [1973]
uses a similar perturbation to justify mixed strategy equilibria. His formulation
requires, however, that the value of θ be common knowledge so observing θi implies
knowing the realization of Ei, but not E−i’s, and that the payoﬀ of player i
depends on θi rather than on θ. Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine [1988] argues that
an equilibrium that is unreasonable (in the sense of being eliminated by Nash
reﬁnements) in a given game may not be unreasonable in nearby games. They
assert that every strict equilibrium is reasonable and they roughly show that
every normal form perfect equilibrium can be approximated by strict equilibria
of nearby games, hence, that any such equilibrium is reasonable as well. Their
paper diﬀers from global perturbation in the deﬁnition of nearness of games and
45in the assumption that only the analyst does not know the payoﬀs, the payoﬀs
are, however, common knowledge among the players themselves.
We now calculate selection on the basis of Harsanyi and Selten’s [1988] risk
dominance, and refute its equivalence to global perturbation, thus to the limit
adjustment dynamic outcome. Refer to the tracing procedure discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2. From (i) and (ii) of the preliminary theory, the outside observer concludes
that player i takes H according to πH
n zi + πH
1 (1 − zi) > πL
1 zi + πL
n(1 − zi), or










Using step (iii), the outside observer forecasts player i’s strategy as qi = (1 −
µ)[H]+µ[L], with diﬀerent qi being independent. The tracing procedure to ﬁnd a
distinguished path in the graph of the correspondence from a linear combination
of the naive G(q) and G(n,Π) to the set of Nash equilibria is simple in the case
at hand. Player i’s expected payoﬀ diﬀerence associated with H and L in G(n,Π)























≡ Φ(1 − µ).
Recalling that Φ(0) < 0 < Φ(1) and Φ is monotonic increasing, write µRD the
unique root of the equation Φ(1 − µ) = 0. Hence, each player’s best response
against q would be H (resp. L) iﬀ µ < (resp. >)µRD. Now it is not diﬃcult to verify









k does not generically satisfy the risk dominance solution Φ(1−µ) = 0, for
n ≥ 3. In this course, one notes that they just happen to be equal when n = 2.
463.6 Strong Result in Two Person Games
We have assumed that the speed of adjustment, represented by Poisson arrival
parameter λ, are identical over the whole population members. This seems not
a severe restriction since we have studied symmetric games. Neverthless, we can
in principle incorporate asymmetric speed of adjustment into our n-person games
by assuming that each population i has a Poisson arrival rate λi, i = 1,2,...,n. A
fair amount of numerical simulations indicate that our main thorem does depend
on these numbers. However, a very strong result holds in any coordination game
with n = 2. We show that, in any – symmetric or not – 2 × 2 games, the limit
dynamic equilibrium outcome is equivalent to global perturbation (and to risk
dominance), despite asymmetric speeds of adjustment as long as the proportion
of adjustment speeds is ﬁxed.
A stage 2 × 2 coordination game, depicted in Figure 3.3, is played repeatedly
by two continuua of identical players. At every point in time, each player from
population 1 is randomly matched to the other player from population 2. We
assume that all members of population i has the adjustment speed λi, where
i = 1,2. Denote yi
t to be the ith population fraction who is currently choosing
action H as of time t. For notational simplicity, let 1 ≡ (1,1) and 0 ≡ (0,0). The








t − µi, i = 1,2, j 6= i,
where µi ≡
di−bi
ai−ci+di−bi. Note that Φi only depends on yj and
∂Φi
∂yj = 1 > 0. Given the
opportunity to move, each player from population i chooses his action maximizing
V
i











11The main thorem of Fudenberg and Harris [1992] states the same result using a completely
47Proposition 5 Fix any 2 × 2 coordination game. In the limit as ρi → 0 for
i = 1,2, with
ρ1
ρ2 = δ ∈ (0,1] ﬁxed, the uniquely absorbing and globally attractive
state is y = 1 (resp. y = 0) iﬀ H (resp. L) is robust with respect to global
perturbation.
For notational simplicity, let ρ2 = ρ. It is easy to check that
λ1 + r
λ1 + λ2 + r
=
1 + δρ
1 + δ + δρ
and
λ2 + r
λ1 + λ2 + r
=
δ + δρ
1 + δ + δρ
.
We state Lemma 5 with the modiﬁed deﬁnition of the sets:
Ω0(δ,ρ) ≡ {(µ1,µ2) ∈ (0,1)
2|µ2 ≥ Fδ,ρ(µ1)}, (3.9)
Ω1(δ,ρ) ≡ {(µ1,µ2) ∈ (0,1)















1+δ+δρ ≤ µ < 1
and
fδ,ρ(µ) ≡ 1 −
(1 + δ + δρ)ρ
(1 + δρ)1+ρ µ
1+ρ.
Lemma 5 The state y is uniquely absorbing and globally attractive iﬀ (µ1,µ2) ∈
Ωy for either y = 0 or 1; both 1 and 0 are absorbing iﬀ (µ1,µ2) ∈ Ω01.
The Lemma above is veriﬁed in Appendix. In this course, one can be aware that
the history dependency region Ω01 is the smallest when δ = 1 (ie, ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ),
diﬀerent evolutionary dynamics with aggregate uncertainty, but the class of games they study
is a narrower symmetric games.
48and that it expands as δ departs away from 1 above or below. This implies that
the discrepancy of frictions between populations causes as severe indeterminacy
problem as the absolute size of frictions themselves. Finally, Proposition 4 obtains
simply by letting ρ → 0 with δ ﬁxed and Carlsson and Van Damme [1990] result
that the equilibrium selection based on global perturbation is equivalent to risk
dominance in any 2 × 2 game.
3.7 Applications
3.7.1 Pure Coordination
Consider a two person pure coordination game. It is often argued that, even
without preplay communication, introspection alone will lead players to coordinate
on the Pareto optimum. This intuition is conﬁrmed as reasonable even in broader
deﬁnition of pure coordination games. A pure coordination game speciﬁes the







a (resp.b) for κ ≤ k ≤ n
c otherwise
where κ may be any of 2,3,...,n, and a > b > c.
Corollary 2 There exists ¯ ρ > 0 such that the only uniquely absorbing and globally
attractive state is y = 1 for any n, y0, and ρ ∈ (0, ¯ ρ). Equivalently, the only
equilibrium selected based on the global perturbation must be the Pareto eﬃcient






n a > n−κ+1




k always holds, it is straight-
forward that, as ρ → 0, the Ω1 set will ultimately occupy the whole Ω and the
remaining region Ω0 and Ω01 be empty sets. The second part is direct from our
main theorem.
493.7.2 Stag Hunt
The most general payoﬀ speciﬁcation that includes the game discussed in the
expository section is as follows:
π
L





2 ≤ ... ≤ π
H
n = 1.
Besides its practical applicability, this game has a couple of merits to analyze.
First, the Pareto optimality is at odds with the security, so which outcome would
actually appear may be controversial. Second, it reduces the Ω sets to a one
dimensional space, which makes the results extremely intuitive and facilitates
numerical studies. Recalling that · denotes a dot product of two vectors, we
deﬁne
u(n,ρ) ≡ α · Π
H and `(n,ρ) ≡ β · Π
H (3.12)
where αk’s and βk’s are as in Eq. (3.5). Directly applying proposition 1 and 2
yields:
Lemma 6 (a) The state y = 1 is globally attractive iﬀ x ≥ u(n,ρ); y = 0 is
globally attractive iﬀ x ≤ `(n,ρ); both y = 1 and y = 0 are absorbing iﬀ `(n,ρ) ≤
x ≤ u(n,ρ);
(b) in the limit as ρ → 0, the state y = 1 (resp. y = 0) is globally attractive iﬀ















k = xGP 6= xRD
The LD in the subscript stands for ‘limit dynamic’. Corollary 3 immediately
follows from Lemma 6 and Carlsson and Van Damme [1991].
503.8 Experimental Implications
A brief survey of Van Huyck et al. [1990, 1991] experimental results is oﬀered.
Each treatment typically lasts ten stages but the number of stages was not an-
nounced in advance in some experiments. A summary statistic of subjects’ strat-
egy choices was publicly announced after each stage. At the end of each experi-
ment, subjects were paid the sum of their payoﬀs in the games they played. In
each of the games, each player i chooses a pure strategy, denoted ei and called
eﬀort, from the set {1,...,7}. In each stage, each player’s payoﬀ was determined
by his own eﬀort and a simple summary statistics of those of the players in his
group. This statistic was either minimum or median of group eﬀort choices. The
parameter values were given for these normal forms12 to be of coordination games
with seven strict Pareto ranked symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria. In every
game, the payoﬀ dominance selects all players’ choosing the highest eﬀort, i.e. 7,
irrespective of the number of subjects in a group. With respect to group size, a
large group consists of 14 to 16 players whilst a small group of only two persons.
Despite payoﬀ dominance, in large group minimum treatments subjects ini-
tially choose widely dispersed eﬀorts and then rapidly approached the lowest ef-
fort, e = 1 : up to 84% of the subjects reached that eﬀort within a few stages. In
one treatment in which the parameters were adjusted so as for the highest eﬀort
e = 7 to be weakly dominant, approximately 96 percentage reached that eﬀort by
the ﬁfth stage. This result may justify our maintained assumption that no strictly
dominated strategy will be played at all.13 In small group experiments, subjects’
initial choices varied substantially and then drifted over time with no clearly
12Van Huyck et al.1990 article for minimum treatments and 1991 research for median ones
contain parameter values actually used in the experiments and the resulting normal forms.
13No conﬂict arises with Cooper et al. [1990] experimental evidence, which just asserts that
any addition or deletion of dominated strategies may aﬀect the equilibrium actually selected.
51discernable trend. By contrast, subjects in every median treatment converged
completely and promptly to the Nash equilibrium determined by the “historical
accident” of their initial stage median, despite considerable variation in the initial
median across treatments. In brevity, it exhibits a strong history dependency.
Finally, in large group median experiments with pure coordination game, players
move swiftly to the Pareto best equilibrium action. This last observation can
be at least partially explained by our corollary 2 and the fact that subjets were
allowed to switch their choices every period.
Our simple model captures many salient features that were reported above.





1 if κ ≤ k ≤ n
0 otherwise,
where κ denotes the minimum number of players necessary for a successful stag
hunt. Note that the minimum rule speciﬁes κ = n and that the median vote does
κ = n+1








with αk and βk as deﬁned in Eq. (3.5). Remember from lemma 6 that the steady
state could be H and L regardless of the initial state, respectively, according as
x < ` and x > u. Certainly there might exist an equilibrium path converging
to, say, H when x > u, if the initial population fraction of stag hunters is very
high. However, we execute the numerical analysis as if the globally attractive
state was globally stable. This is silly but can be tolerated reﬂecting the fact that
the two regions of global attraction roughly oﬀset each other. In the case where
x ∈ [`,u], exactly which equilibrium will be obtained in the long run hinges on
y0, the historical accident of initial states. For the sake of calculation, we impose
the monotonicity requirement, that is, only the paths monotonically converging to
52either H and L will be taken into account. That is, any cyclical path is ruled out.
Deterministic nature of the present dynamic together with monotonicity imply
the existence of a unique critical value of x, below which the path converges to
H, and vice-versa.
We assume throughout that x is uniformly distributed over [0,1]. Two remarks
are in order. First, the strategic uncertainty as has been understood should im-
ply the distribution over the initial y0 with x being ﬁxed. It causes numerically
little problem to consider y0 as deterministic and instead x as uncertain. An-
other justiﬁcation might be the uncertainty on the part of the experimenter about
subjects’ subjective evaluations of the ﬁxed monetary compensation x. Second,
relaxing reasonably the uniformity of the x-distribution here only seems to make
our result stronger. As in Van Huyck et al.’s experiments, we let n = 2 for a small
group and n = 15 for a large group.










where the left (resp. right) hand side is the expected payoﬀ from H (resp. L).
Deterministic nature of the model and the monotonicity of paths make it clear that
a player should choose action H (resp. L) if y0 > (resp. <)y(x) in the intermediate
history dependency region, given an opportunity to switch. The probability that
the steady state be the Pareto inferior Nash L will be at least approximately:
Pr(L is the steady state) = Pr(x ≥ u) + Pr(` < x < u,y0 < y(x))




where u and ` are calculated using Eq. (3.5).





` xdx = 0.5 regardless of ρ. Under a large group minimum rule,




14dx. Table 3.2 provides several
simulations according to varying parameters.14 The range of x in which the Pareto
inferior equilibrium L could be selected irrespective of the initial states is very
broad, unless subjects are extremely impatient. On the other hand, with a big
ρ value, the portion of which both strict equilibria are absorbing is large. But
even in such a situation, the basin of attraction with respect to initial strategic
uncertainty is much larger for L than that for H under maintained assumption
of the path monotonicty. These are reﬂected on the fact that the steady state
is likely to settle down on the inferior equilibrium L with probability of at least
93.3 percent and up to 97 percent. The high probability of attaining the Pareto
inferior equilibrium is consistent with coordination failures which were observed
in Van Huyck et al’s experimental results.
Table 3.3 analogously analyzes the large group median treatments. The prob-
ability that the Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium L will be selected as the long run
state is shown to be stable around 46 percent. The point here is that, for each ρ
given, a relatively wide range between ` and u indicates a strong dependence on
the initial state, or put diﬀerently, “historical accident.” For instance with ρ = 1,
the history dependence region [.008,.125] of a minimum rule is in sharp contrast
to [.300,.767] of median vote. Comparison of tables show that this characteristic
is fairly robust to the somewhat arbitrary parameter ρ size.
We close the section with some loose comments on Harrison and Hirshleifer’s
[1989] public goods provision experiments. Consider two popular models, the
“weakest link” and the “best shot.” The weakest link model refers to the situa-
tion where failure of even a single person brings about miserable ruins to all, for
example military units defending segments of the front against an enemy oﬀen-
14 All simulations were carried out using Mathematica.
54sive. In contrast, the best shot refers to the case where only one’s provision or
success is enough for all, such as rats trying to bell the cat. HH convincingly ar-
gues that the “free-rider” problem would be less (more) serious, thus cooperation
would be more (less) likely to obtain, in the weakest link (best shot, respectively)
model. Reﬂecting the fact that the weakest link is strategically equivalent to the
stag hunt game under the minimum rule, their insight and the basic theme here
seemingly contradict each other. This is not the case. Take the example of mili-
tary units defending segments of the front against an enemy oﬀensive. If all other
units are successfully defending their own segments and if this fact is common
knowledge then it certainly would be in my interest to defend my own. How-
ever, once even a single segment is broken through, running away will be everyone
else’s best response. How does one know the others are doing well? As an obvi-
ous guess, it seems likely that some means of signalling, such as cheap talk and
sequential move structure, could enhance the possibility of cooperation. On the
contrary, the actual failure of or little doubt about the perfect defense will make
the good equilibrium collapse.15 We view this as an underlying reason for HH’s
experimental outcomes, in which subjects show a substantial cooperation with
the sequential protocol while little clearcut evidence on cooperation or behavioral
pattern is perceived with the sealed bid protocol.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
The present paper has of course some shortcomings, especially in its critical de-
pendence on a somewhat arbitrary parameter ρ, the eﬀective discount rate or
friction. Uniformity of the distribution of random noise variables looks to be also
restrictive, although a scrutiny of the proofs in Carlsson and Van Damme [1990]
15 It is a contagious equilibrium in Kandori’s [1992] sense.
55might suggest a relaxation of this assumption. Our conjecture is as follows: under
a general distribution with compact support and given ε > 0, there exists η(ε) > 0
satisfying limε→0 η = 0 such that player i optimally chooses action H (resp. L) if
his private signal θi > θGP +η (resp. < θGP −η). Moreover, this almost dominance
solvability in the limit is reduced to exact dominance solvability under uniform
distribution.
Eﬀort is needed to generalize in encompassing multi actions and/or asymmetric
payoﬀs. Technical diﬃcuties arise from the large amount of case distinctions and
calculations. With m actions, we have to consider 2m−1 number of Ω(·) sets, where
only a is globally attractive if Π ∈ Ωa and only a1, a2, ..., ai are absorbing if
Π ∈ Ωa1a2...ai for 2 ≤ i ≤ m. Payoﬀ asymmety in n person m action games require
considering an nm dimensional space. While there is, at least in principle, no
reason why adjustment dynamics or global perturbation fails to be well-deﬁned
in the general setting, it is known that risk dominance may well be troublesome
because of intransitivities between strict equilibria. In view of our corollary 2,
this line of research seems to include as a special example the former part of
Kandori and Rob [1992], which abandons risk dominance even in a two person
m-action coordination game. Experimental results along the lines of Harrison and
Hirshleifer [1989], Cooper et al. [1992], and Matsui [1991] suggest that it is worth
exploring the introduction of a cheap talk argument, thus to see whether and
how the possibility of cooperation could be enhanced through a costless preplay
communication with more than two players.
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k=1 βk = 1, ∀ρ;







ρ→∞α = (0,...,0,1) and lim
ρ→∞β = (1,0,...,0).
Proof (a) Via mathematical induction. Checking the case of n = 2 is trivial.

















































k=1 βk = 1 is trivial since the elements of the vector β are just a
rearrangement of those of α. To check (b),(c) and (d) is straightforward.
Proposition 3 The state y is globally attractive iﬀ Π ∈ Ωy for either y = 0 or
y = 1; both y = 1 and y = 0 are absorbing iﬀ Π ∈ Ω01. Moreover, if an absorbing
state, y, is globally attractive, then it is a unique absorbing state in [0,1] and any
other state must be fragile.
Proof First of all, notice that Φ(0) = πH
1 − πL
n < 0 < Φ(1) = πH
n − πL
1 and that
Φ is strictly increasing, since
Φ









n−k−2[φk+2 − φk+1] > 0
by the deﬁnition of the φ function and the nondecreasingness of the πk sequences.
The outcome H can be upset when players have an incentive to deviate for
a feasible path from y = 1. Because of the monotonicity of Φ, the incentive to
57deviate is the strongest if all players are anticipated to switch from H to L in the
future, i.e. yt = e−λt. Hence, the condition for y = 1 being fragile is











ρdy ≤ 0. (3.13)
Using Eq. (3.2), the deﬁnition and properties of the Beta and Gamma function,16
and some algebraic manipulation, Eq. (3.13) becomes





















Γ(k + ρ)Γ(n − k + 1)





















which corresponds to the condition deﬁning the Ω0 set. We claim: y = 0 is
globally attractive if and only if Π ∈ Ω0, and that y = 1 is absorbing if and only
if Π ∈ Ω\Ω0. To prove the if part of y = 0 being globally attractive and the only
if part of y = 1 being absorbing, it suﬃces to show that, if Eq. (3.14) holds, i.e.
Π ∈ Ω0, a feasible path from y = 1 to y = 0, yt = e−λt, satisﬁes the equilibrium
condition, i.e. Vt ≤ 0 ∀t along the path. This can be checked as follows:










−(λ+r)sds ≤ 0 ∀t.
16 Refer to any text on mathematical statistics.
58To prove the if part of y = 1 being absorbing and the only if part of y = 0 being
globally attractive, it suﬃces to demonstrate that, if Π ∈ Ω\Ω0, the equilibrium
path is unique and converges to y = 1 for y0 suﬃciently close to 1. Reminding
that any feasible path from y0 satisﬁes yt ≥ y0e−λt, we get






Since the righthand side is strictly positive at y0 = 1 and continuous in y0, it is
still positive for y0 suﬃciently close to 1.
Similarly, the condition for y = 0 being fragile combined with the change of
variable technique will be











Again by the deﬁnition of Φ function, the properties of Gamma and Beta function,









Γ(k)Γ(n − k + ρ)





















which is the condition deﬁning Ω1. A symmetric argument as before shows that
y = 1 is globally attractive if and only if Π ∈ Ω1, and that y = 0 is absorbing if
and only if Π ∈ Ω\Ω1.
Combining all the facts shown yields the desired result.
Lemma 4 If Assumption 1 and 2 hold, then the equilibrium is characterized by
59cutoﬀ θGP such that player i optimally chooses H (resp. L) iﬀ θi > (resp. <)θGP.









Proof Notice that the existence and uniqueness of such θGP are guaranteed by
assumption 1(a) and 1(c). As was suggested, we maintain the assumption that no
player will choose strictly dominated strategies. Player i will certainly choose H
if θi > ¯ θ: Since the expected value is E(Θ|θε
i = θi) = θi, player i knows that H is
strictly dominant at each such observation. Consider an observation θi of player i
slightly below ¯ θ, such be that |¯ θ −θi| < 2ε. Player i knows that his opponent will
play H if θj > ¯ θ, hence i’s payoﬀ if he chooses H at θi is approximately
n X
k=1
Pr(θj > θi for exactly k − 1 opponents|Θ
ε
i ≈ ¯ θ)p
H




Pr(Ej > Ei for exactly k − 1 opponent)p
H








k (¯ θ). (3.17)
Assumption 2 allows us to conclude that the probability in the Eq. (3.15) is
independent of θi, at least as long as θi lies ε inside the support of Θ. This
observation allows us to conclude that this probability must be equal to the a
priori probability that Ei is the k + 1th smallest among the errors. Thus, the
Eq. (3.16) ensues, the probability in which is clearly the same for all players. This
fact, combined with the assumption that the i.i.d. of Ei has a continuous density,
yields Eq. (3.17).









k (¯ θ) calculated
above by the monotonicity assumption 1(a). Hence, if θGP < ¯ θ, there exists ¯ θ1
such that H is strictly dominant for any θi > ¯ θ1 in the reduced game where player
j is constrained to play H when θj > ¯ θ. In a similar way one can construct ¯ θ2 < ¯ θ1
60and continuing inductively, we can ﬁnd sequences ¯ θm such that H is iteratively
dominant for θi > ¯ θm.
On the other hand, starting from the maintained assumption that action L will
be chosen when θi < θ, we inductively ﬁnd a sequence θ
m such that L is iteratively
dominant for θi < θ
m. By the deﬁnition of θGP, it is obvious that ¯ θm ↓ θGP and
θ
m ↑ θGP as m → ∞.
Lemma 5 The state y is uniquely absorbing and globally attractive iﬀ (µ1,µ2) ∈
Ωy for either y = 0 or 1; both 1 and 0 are absorbing iﬀ (µ1,µ2) ∈ Ω01.
Proof Without loss of generality, assume µ1 ≤ µ2 and δ ≤ 1.
Case 1: µi ≥
λi+r
λ1+λ2+r for i = 1,2.
The outcome H can be upset when players have an incentive to deviate for a
feasible path from (y1,y2) = 1. Because of the monotonicity of Φi, the incentive
to deviate is the strongest if all players are anticipated to switch from H to L in
the future, i.e. yi
t = yi
0e−λit for i = 1,2. Hence, the state 1 is fragile since
V
i











−λjt λi + r
λ1 + λ2 + r
− µi ≤ 0
for any t and y
j
0.
Case 2: fδ,ρ(µ1) ≤ µ2 ≤
1+δρ
1+δ+δρ





1+δρ , then the monotonically










1 fort < T




1 + δ + δρ
1 + δρ
. (3.18)
The path described above is indeed an equilibrium since
V
1




















= fδ,ρ(µ1) − µ2 ≤ 0.
Case 3: µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ fδ,ρ(µ1).
Note that this also implies µ1 <
1+δρ




















1 + δ + δρ
− µ1 > 0.
This implies that, for y2
0 > µ1
1+δ+δρ
1+δρ , V 1









1 − (1 − y1
0)eλ1t if t < T
(1 − (1 − y1
0)e−λ1T)e−λ1(t−T) if t > T
for all t > 0. Using the fact that the right hand side is continuous in y1
0, and that
V 2
0 ≥ fδ,ρ(µ1) − µ2 > 0, there exists a neighborhood of 1 such that V i
0 > 0 for
i = 1,2, thus 1 is absorbing.
Similar arguments show all the other cases, including the case of δ > 1 and
the region
where the state 0 is fragile.
62Stag Hare
Stag 10, 10 0, x
Hare x, 0 x, x
Figure 3.1: Two-Player Stag Hunt Game
. Stag Hare Stag Hare
Stag 10,10,10 0,x,0 0,0,x 0,x,x
Hare x,0,0 x,x,0 x,0,x x,x,x
Stag Hare
Figure 3.2: Three-Player Stag Hunt Game
0 < x < 10
63n 2 3 15 99
rule mim med min med mim med
Limit Dynamics 5 3.33 6.67 0.67 5.33 0.10 5.05
Global Perturbation 5 3.33 6.67 0.67 5.33 0.10 5.05
Risk Dominance 5 3.82 6.18 1.34 5.26 0.34 5.01




ai > ci,ai ≥ di > bi, i = 1,2.
Figure 3.3: General 2 × 2 Game
64ρ 0 0.1 0.5 1 10 102 ∞
u .067 ..073 .097 .125 .440 .878 1.000
` .067 .053 .020 .008 .001 ..000 .000
H .067 .056 .035 .030 .053 .066 ..067
L .933 .944 .965 .970 .947 .934 .933
Table 3.2: Large Group Minimum Rule
ρ 0 0.1 0.5 1 10 102 ∞
u .533 .566 .673 .767 .997 1.000 1.000
` .533 .502 ..398 .300 .183 .000 .000
H .533 ..536 .541 .544 .534 .533 .533
L .467 .464 .459 .456 .466 .467 .467





In this paper, we analyze a game played by randomly and anonymously matched
players from a large population. The class of games we study are symmetric, bi-
nary action, multiperson coordination games with two strict Pareto-ranked Nash
equilibria. Existing reﬁnements are powerless to select between these equilibria.
For instance, many of the stringent solution concepts proposed in the literature,
such as the strategic stability of Kohlberg and Mertens [1986], are silent concern-
ing the selection among several strict Nash equilibria. Furthermore, some recent
studies on learning have also addressed the question of how a particular equilib-
rium will emerge in a dynamic context. Although some convergence results are
obtained, these studies do not oﬀer an equilibrium selection criterion, since in
these models the strict Nash equilibria all share the same dynamic properties.
One approach for resolving equilibrium selection indeterminacy is to consider
an actual adjustment process which operates in real time, and to see what limit
outcomes if any might appear. We allow players to have the opportunity from time
to time to revise their choices given what their opponents are currently doing, and
given the correct expectation about the future play of the game—namely, perfect
foresight. If this continuous revision process settles down to a unique outcome,
then this outcome should be the analyst’s predection of how the game might be
played. Therefore, this approach has the potential to explain how equilibrium
is attained, and of singling out a unique equilibrium in situations where the un-
derlying stage game has a plethora of outcomes. Using deterministic adjustment
dynamics with perfect foresight, Kim [1992a] provides a full characterization of the
dynamic equilibrium outcomes as a function of the payoﬀ matrix and an eﬀective
discount rate. More importantly and loosely speaking, an the dynamic outcome,
in the limit as players become very patient, selects uniqely from the strict Nash
67equilibria depending on the payoﬀ matrix. The resulting equilibrium selection
suggests the following introspection arguments. Consider a player about to play a
one-shot n-person coordination game. Each player faces (n−1) opponents, and so
there are n possibilities where in each possibility (k −1) out of (n−1) opponents
choose action H for k = 1,...,n. Denote Ak−1 each of these possible events. As-
sume that the player places equal uniform probability 1/n on each event Ak−1 for
k = 1,...,n. Notice that this probability assignment necessarily implies that a
player presumes some degree of correlation between opponents’ choices. Surpris-
ingly, this outcome coincides with Carlsson and Van Damme’s [1990, 1991] static
notion of equilibrium selection called global perturbation.1
In the opposite limit as players become myopic, both strict equilibria can
be simply reached, and exactly which equilibrium will be actually obtained in the
long run depends crucially upon the initial state. This is reﬂected in the fact that,
in the framework of an evolutionary process which assumes myopia, Darwinian
deterministic dynamics may well possess multiple steady states and the asymptotic
behavior of the system depends on the historical accident of initial conditions.
Trouble persists even if we perturb the deterministic dynamic system with a one-
time mutation, which is the idea behind the concept of standard evolutionary
strategic stability (in brevity, ESS).2 Moreover, we note here that the connection
between myopic replicator dynamics and strategic stability or rationalizability is
vacuous in coordination games, since all strict Nash equilibria simply survive strict
iterative admissibility.
Another approach to resolve indeterminacy is to introduce a probabilistic ﬂow
of small mutations or experimentations, thus making the dynamic system stochas-
tic. The resulting stochastic law of motion possesses a well-deﬁned, steady-state
1Refer to Kim [1992a] for formal proof, or Section 4.5 below for summary.
2For an excellent survey of ESS refer to Hofbauer and Sigmund [1988].
68ergodic distribution.3 Consequently, this approach highlights certain strategy con-
ﬁgurations as likely to be observed much more frequently than others, especially
in the limit as the chance of mutations vanishes. And it turns out that the power
to distinguish between multiple strict Nash equilibria returns even under myopia.
The long-run state derived using stochastic evolutionary dynamics with myopia
corresponds to the static equilibrium selection motivated by the following intro-
spection arguments. Assume that each of the player’s opponents choose actions H
and L with probability half on each. Also assume that players do this randomiza-
tion independently of each other. Under this assumption, a player can calculate
the expected payoﬀ from each action. The player then chooses which action to
take based on this calculation.
Much of the existing literature have asserted that the limit dynamic equi-
librium outcome coincides with Harsanyi and Selten’s [1988] notion of risk domi-
nance. In this paper, we provide an overview of the connection between the nature
of the dynamic process and static equilibrium selection. This paper refutes the
conjectured equivalence between the limit dynamic outcome and risk dominance.
We also show that, only for two-person, bimatrix games, the following four equi-
librium selection rules all happen to coincide: (1) deterministic dynamics with
patient players, (2) stochastic evolutionary dynamics, (3) global perturbation,
and (4) risk dominance. Finally, for any general pure coordination game, a much
stronger result can be obtained that supports Pareto eﬃciency, regardless of the
underlying dynamics.
Some readers might be surprised upon recognizing that the selected Nash equi-
librium may diﬀer depending on the underlying dynamics. It seems to me entirely
3The core mathematical idea was developed by Freidlin and Wentzell [1984] in the context of
general dynamic systems, and was applied to games by Foster and Young [1990], Young [1992],
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob [1992], and Kandori and Rob [1992]. However, these studies only
concentrate on two-person games.
69reasonable that the long-run, steady-state equilibria or social conventions which
have been formed and established for a long period of time may well diﬀer, depend-
ing on the nature of the social system, characteristics of the members consisting
of the society, the type of individual interactions within one’s environment, and so
forth. We should not expect exactly the same prediction about behavioral pattern
when we model animal actions, such as mating contests and hunting and preying
contests, as when we model highly sophisticated and patient human decisions,
such as choosing computer software and locating factories or stores. More impor-
tantly and interestingly enough, there exists a remarkable link between the nature
of the adjustment dynamics and the selection of static equilibrium. The dynamic
outcome that is obtained with more patient players seems to correspond to static
behavior that assumes more correlated play by opponents, and vice versa.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formally deﬁnes
the game of interest. Section 4.3 reviews the dynamic equilibrium outcome under
the deterministic adjustment dynamics with patient players. Section 4.4 analzes
the long-run states under stochastic evolutionary dynamics with myopic players.
Section 4.5 contains the main discussion of the ideas in this paper, such as the
relationship between the nature of dynamic systems and the static equilibrium
selection and the interpretations of selection criteria. The ﬁnal section concludes
with some comments.
4.2 The Game
We consider a symmetric n-person coordination game with binary actions, denoted
by High (H) and Low (L). Consider a strategy proﬁle in which k agents choose
H with the remaining (n − k) agents choosing L. For notational convenience, we
denote πH
k and πL
n−k to be the payoﬀ for a player taking H and L respectively,
























The ﬁrst set of inequalities in Eq. (4.1) imply that a player taking a particular
action is no worse oﬀ when the number of opponents taking the same action
increases. The next two inequalities require that all players playing a common
action be a strict Nash equilibrium. The last inequality means that the equilibrium
when all players play H, denoted by H, is better than the one when all players
play L, denoted by L. Now, the following preliminary result is straightforward:
Lemma 7 If Π ∈ Ω then the only pure strategy equilibria of G(n,Π) are two strict
Nash, viz. H and L.





n−k+1 are not satisﬁed, since otherwise the pure strategy proﬁle of k players











which contradicts the deﬁnition of the Ω set.
All of the Nash reﬁnements, including the strategic stability of Kohlberg
and Mertens, are powerless in selecting between these two strict Nash equilib-
ria. Pareto eﬃciency is compatible with equilibrium play, so neither an incentive
problem nor conﬂict exists. However, it is not clear whether players will be able to
reach this outcome in a noncooperative situation where no direct communication
is allowed. In short, strategic uncertainty matters.
714.3 Adjustment Dynamics
We begin with the following determinsitic adjustment dynamics, which was orig-
inally introduced by Matsui and Matsuyama [1991] and subsequently studied by
Kim [1992a]. Time is continuous on [0,∞). The game G(n,Π) is played repeat-
edly in a society with a continuum of identical players. At every point in time,
each and every player is matched to form a group with (n − 1) other anonymous
players, who are randomly drawn from the population. All players behave ratio-
nally, choosing a strategy to maximize one’s expected discounted payoﬀ. However,
adjustments are costly, so that players can revise actions only periodically. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that the opportunity to switch actions arrives randomly
and independently across players, following a Poisson process with mean arrival
rate λ. This is called an inertia assumption with the speed of adjustment λ.
We allow players to have the chance from time to time to revise their choices
given what their opponents are currently doing, and given the correct expecta-
tion about the future play of the game, namely, perfect foresight. The dynamic
system is deterministic in that there is neither stochastic shocks nor aggregate
uncertainty.
The strategy distribution of the society as of time t can be described by the
state variable yt, the fraction of players that are committed to action H at time
t. The state space thus is [0,1]. When the opportunity to switch actions arrives,
players choose the action which results in higher expected discounted payoﬀs, with
respect to the future, expected path of y, as well as their own inability to switch
actions continuously. Let Φ(yt) be the value of playing action H instead of L at
time t. Denote Vt to be discounted expected payoﬀ given perfect foresight path
yt+s,s ≥ 0, i.e.,





72then players will commit to H if Vt > 0 or they will commit to L if Vt < 0, with
indiﬀerence optimal if Vt = 0. with r > 0 being the discount factor. We deﬁne
r/λ to be the eﬀective discount rate or the degree of friction. To say that the
friction vanishes implies that players are very patient, or that each player can
revise his action whenever he wants. On the other hand, to say that the friction
grows without bound implies that players only care about their immediate gains,
that is players are myopic.
Chapter 3 fully characterizes the dynamic equilibrium outcome in terms of
group size and eﬀective discount rate. We need to introduce the following termi-
nology: A state y is said to be absorbing if a neighborhood U of y exists such that
any equilibrium path from U converges to y. It is said to be globally attractive if
there exists an equilibrium path that reaches or converges to that state from any
initial condition. It can be shown that in the limit as the friction vanishes either
all players playing action H (i.e. y = 1) or all players playing action L (i.e. y = 0)
will be the unique, absorbing and globally attractive state, depending upon the
payoﬀ matrix and group size. More precisely, we restate the following:
Proposition 6 (Kim [1992]) (a) In the limit as players become patient, the















with L selected when the inequality is reversed. (b) In the limit as players become
myopic, both H and L can be selected as absorbing states.
Surprisingly, the equilibrium selected coincides with the one selected by Carls-
son and Van Damme’s [1990, 1991] static notion of global perturbation. Trembles
are introduced into the game in such a way that payoﬀs are almost but not per-
fectly common knowledge, and that there is a chance that each of the actions
73can be a dominated strategy. More precisely, each player receives a private signal
about the payoﬀs, but is unable to fully separate the true payoﬀ realization from
one’s private noisy signal. Lack of common knowledge among players makes it
possible for strictly dominated strategies to exert an inﬂuence. This fact suggests
that, to solve the resulting incomplete information game, we must use iterative
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The result of iterative strict domi-
nance prescribes that all players play either H or L, depending on the payoﬀ ma-
trix of the original unperturbed game. Equilibrium selection based upon global
perturbation refers to the one obtained at the exactly original game as common
knowledge about payoﬀs becomes arbitrarily perfect. To recapitulate, the major
argument of Chapter 3 is that the limiting dynamic outcome is equivalent to the
static equilibrium selection based on global perturbation.
Proposition 6(b) suggests that in the limit as players become myopic exactly
which equilibrium between H and L will be obtained in the long run depends
crucially upon the initial state. In other words, no a priori selection among the
multiple Nash equilibria can be made. How to restore some ability for equilibrium
selection will be discussed in the next section.
4.4 Evolutionary Dynamics
4.4.1 Characterization
For analytical convenience, we modify the repeated societal interactions as follows.
Time is discrete and is denoted by t = {0,1,...,}.4 The game G(n,Π) is played
repeatedly in a society with a ﬁnite number of identical players N which is an
integer divisible by n. The state variable zt is the number of players adopting
action H at time t, with the state space Z = {0,1,...,N}. Let yt = zt/N be
4The analysis extends to a continuous time formulation, as will be mentioned later.
74the fraction of players choosing action H at t. Within period t, there are a large
number of random matches among the players so that each player’s average payoﬀ
in that period is equal to the expected payoﬀ. That is, the value of playing action















where φk ≡ πH
k − πL
n−k+1 is nondecreasing in k. 5
Consider the myopic limit in the adjustment dynamics as discussed in the
previous section, that is, time discount rate r becomes arbitrarily large. Together
with the inertia assumption, this implies that, given the chance to move, each
player adopts a best response against the current strategy conﬁguration of the
society as a whole. In other words, players commit to action H if Φ(zt) > 0,
and to action L if Φ(zt) < 0. This suggests Darwinian deterministic dynamics,
denoted by P(0), which prescribes the state ˆ zt+1 = f(zt) at t+1 with the following
properties:
(A1) sign(f(z) − z) = sign(Φ(z)) for z 6= 0, or N.
(A2) f(0) = 0 and f(N) = N.
Notice that property (A2) says that players change their strategies only when their
current strategies are strictly worse than the best ones. This assures that, once a
5This formula is derived by denoting z as the number of other players playing action H. The





























Using this expression only increases the analytical complications without changing our results.
75Nash equilibrium is reached, the society stays there forever. In particular, since
the stage game G(n,Π) has multiple strict Nash equilibria, the dynamic system
P(0) may well possess multiple steady states and that the asymptotic behavior of
the system depends on the initial condition z0.
This problem persists even if we introduce a small, once-and-for-all distur-
bance into the dynamic system—this is the idea behind the concept of standard
evolutionary stability. Notice that the connection between myopic replicator dy-
namics and strategic stability or rationalizability is vacuous with respect to co-
ordination games, since both strict Nash equilibria simply survive strict iterative
admissibility.6
This kind of equilibrium selection indeterminacy is resolved if we perturb the
system with a constant ﬂow of mutations or experimentations. The idea behind
mutations is to test the stability of states by repeatedly subjecting them to dis-
turbances, and observe to which states the society tends to return. Denote ε to
be the mutation rate. This yields the following nonlinear stochastic dynamics:





where ˆ z is the planned state prescribed by Darwinian deterministic dynamics,
xHL
t ∼ Bin(ˆ zt+1,ε) and xLH ∼ Bin(N −ˆ zt+1,ε). The dynamic system P(ε) deﬁnes







Given P(ε), the system perpetually ﬂips around in Z. Hence, we consider
a particular stochastic equilibrium concept by measuring the average proportion
of time that the society will spend in each state. Formally, let ∆N be the N
6Refer to Swinkels [1992] and references therein.
76dimensional simplex. A stationary distribution or invariant measure is a row
vector µ ∈ ∆N satisfying:
µ(ε)P(ε) = µ(ε). (4.7)
Under our assumptions, the matrix P is irreducible, so that the stationary dis-
tribution has certain nice properties, namely uniqueness, global stability and
ergodicity.7 Global stability implies that, independent of the initial state, the
system converges to the stationary distribution µ. Ergodicity implies that µ can
be interpreted as the proportion of time that the society spends in each state. We
will next examine the long-run behavior of the system when the probability of
mutation is arbitrarily small. To this end, we introduce the following concepts.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The limit distribution µ∗ is deﬁned by limε→0 µ(ε).
Deﬁnition 4.2 The set of long run equilibria is the carrier of µ∗.
We identify the long-run states by using a graph-theoretic characterization of
the invariant measures µ(ε). According to this approach, µ is a scalar multiple of







and where Bz is the set of one particular class of directed graphs deﬁned on the
state space Z, called z-trees. A z-tree is a set of directed branches, which means
that every z0 6= z is the origin of exactly one branch, and that starting from any
such state there is a unique sequence of branches terminating at z.







7Refer to any standard textbook such as Karlin and Taylor [1975].
77should tend to zero as ε ↓ 0. Note that the stationary distribution µ equals
q/
PN
z=0 qz, and in this expression both the denominator and the numerator tend
to zero as ε ↓ 0. So, the identiﬁcation of the long-run states, which receive positive
probability in the limit, hinges on how fast each qz vanishes. Deﬁne the cost of
transition between state z and z0 as c(z,z0) = |f(z) − z0|, which is the minimum
number of mutations to achieve state z0 from state z. Thus, if vz is the speed of
convergence of qz to zero, that is, qz = o(εvz), then eqns. (4.8) and (4.9) imply:







We call vz the cost of transition to state z, and it can be thought as the
diﬃculty of achieving state z in the long run. The problem of ﬁnding the set of
long-run states is reduced to the problem of minimizing Eq. (4.10) over all states









In other words, the long-run states are those with the least cost of transition.
4.4.2 Equilibrium Selection
We show that either one or the other of the strict Nash equilibria of any coordina-
tion game G(n,Π) is selected in the long run, depending on the payoﬀ matrix and
the group size. We summarize the selection criterion in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 For N suﬃciently large, the selected, unique long-run equilibrium

















2n−1 for k = 1,...,n. (4.13)
78And when the inequality is reversed, the long-run equilibrium becomes L.
Obviously, in the nongeneric case of equality, the selected, long-run equilibrium
can be either H and L. Moreover, the limit stationary distribution places proba-
bility half on each. Two lemmas are helpful for proof of the Proposition 7.
Lemma 8 For N suﬃciently large, Φ(z) = 0 has a unique root in [0,N].
Proof For z = 0,...,n−1, eq. (4.4) can be reduced to Φ(z) ≈ φ1+
Pz
k=1 o(N−k)φk.
Since φ1 ≡ πH
1 − πL
n < 0 by eq. (1), the value of Φ(z) is negative if N is large
enough. Similarly, for z = N −1,N −2,...,N −n+1, the value of Φ(z) is shown
to be positive if N is large enough.






























n−k−1)] > 0 .
Hence, Φ(z) is increasing in z, for N large enough. Combining these facts yields
the desired result.
Immediate from Lemma 8 is that there exists a critical population level z∗ for
which the two states 0 and N have basins of attraction under the dynamic b(·)
given by {z < z∗} and {z > z∗}, respectively. The relative sizes of these basins
of attraction are a crucial determinant of the limit distribution. With respect to
this, the following result is important:
Lemma 9 For N suﬃciently large and any Darwinian dynamic process P(0) sat-
isfying properties (A1) and (A2), the limit distribution for G(n,Π) puts probability
one on N if z∗ < N
2 , or probability one on 0 when the inequality is reversed.
79Lemma 9 is directly taken from Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1991]. Although
they have two-player games in mind, everything goes through with three or more
players, thus the proof is omitted.
Now we are ready for the proof:
Proof of Proposition 7 In principle, we can calculate the unique root z∗ as a
function of n, Π and N, and then see what happens to z∗ = N/2 as N becomes
large. But this procedure is rather complicated. The trick is to plug z = N/2
directly into the Φ(z) = 0 equation, and then see what happens in the limit as
N → ∞.















! φk = 0 . (4.14)





M(M − 1)···(M − (k − 2))(M − 1)···(M − (n − k))
(2M − 1)(2M − 2)···(2M − (n − 1))
.
This expression goes to wk in the limit as M → ∞. Plugging φk ≡ πH
k − πL
n−k+1
and the expression for wk into Eq. (4.14) yields the desired result.
The results derived thus far are robust when extended to a continuous time
formulation, as long as we maintain the assumptions that the popualtion is ﬁnite
and that mutations and the opportunity to switch actions are independent over
time and across players. The trick is to map continuous time into discrete time
by focusing attention on the stopping times when the state changes. Even though
simultaneous mutations never occur in continuous time, a sequence of single mu-
tations can occur within a short time interval, in which no adjustment of strategy
80takes place. In other words, the most likely way to upset an equilibrium is to have
a series of mutations within a short time interval, before the selection pressure
takes place. One can show without much diﬃculty that the long-run equilibrium
emerges irrespective of the speed of adjustment in each basin.8
4.5 Main Discussion
Our results for equilibrium selection come under two broad categories:
1. Equilibrium selection obtained under deterministic perfect foresight adjust-
ment dynamics with patient players (Proposition 6).
2. Equilibrium selection obtained under stochastic evolutionary dynamics with
myopic players (Proposition 7).
I now would like to address the issue of how these two categories diﬀer.
The assumption of inertia or costly adjustment is common to both. Given
the chance to move, players choose a best response with respect to some suitably
deﬁned objective function, in our two cases, the expected discounted payoﬀ cal-
culated under perfect foresight and the average payoﬀ given the current strategy
conﬁguration. Neither the time formulation nor population size matter. Stochas-
tic shocks—through the possibility of mutations—in the dynamics with myopia
plays a crucial role in reviving the power to select equilibria, but not in its charac-
terization. The crucial diﬀerence is how players value the future, namely patience.
Let us refer to P-selection as equilibrium selection according to eq. (4.3) of Propo-
sition 6, and M-selection as equilibrium selection according to eqns (4.12) and
(4.13) of Proposition 7; here, “P” stands for patience and “M” stands for myopia.
8Refer to Kandori [1991] for details.
81Now, consider the relationship between the long-run equilibrium obtained un-
der dynamics in actual time to the static, one-shot equilibrium selected by in-
trospection arguments. Consider the situation in which a player about to play
the one-shot game G(n,Π). The player is confronted with (n − 1) opponents,
meaning that there are n possible events Ak−1, for k = 1,...,n, in which (k − 1)
out of (n − 1) opponents choose action H. For this game, M-selection is inter-
preted as follows: the player assumes that each opponent chooses action H and L
with probability half on each. The player further assumes that all the opponents
do this randomization independently of each other. Under these assumptions, it
can be easily checked that the event Ak−1 occurs with probability wk deﬁned by
eq. (4.13). Hence, the player should choose either actions H or L if the expected
payoﬀ from either is greater, as it is in eq. (4.12). On the other hand, P-selection
directly places equal probability 1/n on each possible event Ak−1. This proba-
bility assignment necessarily implies that the player presumes some correlation
among the opponents’ choices, contrary to the independence assumption of the
player’s opponents’ choices in M-selection. If the group size is n = 2, the player
has only one opponent, so that this distinction simply disappears. Hence, the two
equilibrium selection categories coincide with each other, and by chance, to risk
dominance.
Since in the case of a 2 × 2 game, the player has only one opponent, so that
there is no distinction between the two selection categories, we have that M-
and P-selection coincide with each other. Furthermore, we have the following
proposition:





Proof The preceding arguments in the text above imply that (a) and (b) coincide
when n = 2. Equivalence between (b) and (c) is true in general Chapter 4.3 of
this paper. Carlsson and Van Damme [1990] verify the equivalence between (c)
and (d) for two-person, bimatrix games.
The limit behavior of Blume’s [1991] dynamic process with respect to parametric
changes making strategy revisions a best response is shown to give rise to the
same outcome as risk dominance in 2 × 2 coordination games. Kandori, Mailath,
and Rob [1992]—upon which our Section 4 depends heavily—and Fudenberg and
Harris [1992] show that, in 2×2 games, as the mutation rate and noise go to zero,
the ergodic distribution becomes concentrated on the risk dominant equilibrium.9
Lastly, Matsui and Matsuyama [1991]—from which our model borrows heavily—
shows an equivalence between risk dominance and dynamic stability in 2 × 2
games of common interest. From the viewpoint of Proposition 8 above, the ﬁrst
three papers (i.e. Blume, KMR and FH) claim nothing but the equivalence be-
tween M-selection and risk dominance, with the last paper (ie, MM) claiming the
equivalence between P-selection and risk dominance.
We now study a generalized pure-coordination or simply voting game, where




as if ](s) ≥ κ
0 otherwise
where ](s) denotes the total number of players choosing action s, and κ may be
2,..,n. Moerover, all coordinated equilibria are ordered, that is, 0 ≤ as ≤ as0, ∀s <
9Fudenberg and Harris needs to be read with some care, since in this paper, the population is
large and the random perturbation is introduced by a Brownian motion, so that the stochastic
shocks are necessarily correlated across players. This is in sharp contrast to our assumption
concerning the independence of the random shocks across players and over time.
83s0. This class of games, denoted G(n,m;Πκ) to emphasize the importance of κ.
possesses m pure strategy Pareto rankable Nash equilibria, everyone’s choosing
action s = 1,2,...,m. It requires that both the voting rule (represented by κ) and
the security (normalized to zero) be identical over all choices. Then we have:10
Proposition 9 In any G(n,m;Πκ), the Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium is sup-
ported, regardless of the underlying dynamics.
Proof is lengthy, but the idea is intuitive. The previous sections suggest that
Pareto eﬃciency is guaranteed when the number of actions is two, i.e. m = 2.
With three or more actions, we apply the selection criterion in a pairwise way.
The only case that we have to worry about is lack of transitivities, but this cannot
occur in the present class of games.
proof
(1) Deterministic Adjustment Dynamic with Patient Players:
All the proofs of Section 3 apply straightforwardly, so we omit them. After all,
we are able to show that: if ρ ∈ (0, ¯ ρ], then the Pareto eﬃcient outcome is
uniquely absorbing and globally attractive and thus is robust with respect to
global perturbation.
(2) Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics:
Given a chance to move and the state z = (z1,...,zm), the expected average
payoﬀ for the player who has been choosing action s is calculated as
(
fκ(zs − 1)as if he chooses s again
fκ(zs0)as0 if he chooses s0 6= s
(4.15)
10We can easily construct counterexamples demonstrating the fact that both identical rule















! , z ∈ Z ≡ {0,1,...,N}
(4.16)
The next lemma is just a technical result but plays an important role in what
follows.
Lemma 10 For any κ, the function fκ(z) is strictly increasing in z ∈ Z.
Proof Via mathematical induction. Without loss of generality, assume z ∈
{n − 1,n,...,N − n}. For κ = n, a direct calculation shows that









Now suppose it is true for κ + 1 that
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Lemma 11 Any mixed strategy is unstable.
Proof Assume not, i.e. there exist s,s0 ∈ C(z) with s < s0, and both s and s0
are best reponses to z. Then we get
f(z
s0
− 1)as0 ≥ f(z
s)as > f(z





85The strict inequalities follow from Lemma 7 and the weak inequalities follow from
the presumed optimality of s and s0 relative to z. The contracdiction establishes
the desired result.
Lemma 12 The collection of limit sets is {es}m
s=1.
This last lemma states that the Darwinian dynamic for the game G(n,m;Πκ)
converges to a pure strategy Nash conﬁguration with probability one. The same
logic as in Proposition 7(2) of KR applies, so proof is omitted. Now we are ready
to verify the Pareto eﬃciency under stochastic evolutionary dynamics:
Recalling Eq. (16), the ﬁrst task is to compute costs of transition Cs0s between limit
sets, es and es0. Assume the society is initially clustered at es0, then the minimum
number of mutations, x, needed to switch it over into the basin of attraction of es
is determined by f(x)as ≥ f(N − 1 − x)as0. This represents an immediate jump
to escape the best response region of s0, and the triangular inequality argument
of KR’s Proposition 5 guarantees that no gradual escape is less costly than this
immediate jump. Note that we mutate individuals taking s0 into s, because any
other mutation will only raise the transition cost more. Thus, the cost of transition
Cs0s is the minimum integer x satisfying




It has a unique root, since Lemma 7 implies that the left hand side of Eq. (31) is
strictly increasing and so its right hand side is strictly decreasing in x.
Since a pure coordination game G(n,m;Πκ) speciﬁes 0 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ ··· ≤ am,
we can easily check that
Cs0m < Cs0s, ∀s < m,∀s
0 6= s, and Cm,m−1 < Cs0,m−1, ∀s
0 < m − 1.
86Therefore, the ﬁrst step of the optimum branching algorithm as in Appendix B of
KR is to choose a minimum cost outgoing branch from each state, which results
in the system of branches (s → m), s = 1,2,...,m − 1, and (m → m − 1). The
longest branch among these is of length Cm,m−1. Therefore we drop it, and are
left with an m-tree. This completes the algorithm.
Corollary 4 In any pure coordination game, the dynamic equilibrium outcome
selects the Pareto-eﬃcient outcome H, irrespective of the details of the underlying
adjustment dynamics.
4.6 Final Remarks
We have generalized results on equilibrium selection in the direction of group
size. However, the assumption of binary strategies is obviously restrictive. A full
characterization of the long-run states for broader classes of games beyond those
studied in this paper seems diﬃcult, because of the numerous case distinctions and
complicated calculations. This is the reason why Kandori and Rob [1992] ends up
only solving the two-player, three-action supermodular game. Yet, it does seem
valuable to characterize the general properties of the long-run states for broader
classes of multiperson games, such as multiperson supermodular games. We will
have to await further research in this direction for answers.
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